

US Army Civil Affairs Ministerial Advisory Teams Deploy to Haiti

Brigadier General B.B. Bingham, US Army Reserve;
Colonel D.L. Rubini, US Army, Retired; and
Colonel M.J. Cleary, US Army Reserve

THE MILITARY HAS TROUBLE coming to terms with post-Cold War peacekeeping in places like Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. It is easy to understand the unease. Soldiers train to close with and destroy the enemy as they did in the Gulf. Peace operations, on the other hand, require restraint and a minimum of force. It is difficult to ask young American soldiers to be both warrior and constable.¹ In Haiti, Operation *Uphold Democracy* once again placed demands on the US Army's civil affairs (CA) branch for specialized talent to work with heads of a foreign government at the ministerial level in civil administration. A similar high-level CA team deployed to Operations *Desert Shield/Storm* to work with ministries of the Government of Kuwait (GOK). The Kuwaiti task force helped jump-start the GOK ministries by providing essential services and reestablishing stability. CA operations in Haiti built on the Kuwaiti task force's experience. After US soldiers arrived in Haiti, they "ran the place."² More and more, reliance for success in this new setting has been placed on US diplomat-warriors. CA soldiers have the doctrine, training, experience and personal commitment to deal with civilian organizations and agencies.³

CA offers something not found in the rest of the Armed Forces: "skills needed to manage a country's infrastructure—sanitation, public transport, legal systems, health care systems, import/export systems, commerce and other public services."⁴ Skilled Reserve soldiers have provided such services in Panama, the Persian Gulf and Haiti.⁵ CA was the military's executive agent in working with the Haitian ministries.

The CA Ministerial Advisory Team (MAT) was formed in cooperation with the US Embassy and the US Agency for International Development (USAID) to assist the ambassador in advising the Government of Haiti (GOH) in reestablishing government func-

Thirty-four CA professionals were assigned [to MAT]. In civilian life they were urban development specialists, environmental scientists, educators, engineers, doctors, lawyers, bankers, business leaders and law enforcement experts. For more than five months, the MAT soldiers devoted their years of experience in private practice, law enforcement and government work to restarting and reforming the GOH.

tions. These CA MATs worked with all Haitian ministries in cooperation with USAID and was the bridge between the US government (USG) and GOH until USAID programs could be brought online. MAT objectives helped accomplish objectives in the broad sense. Specifically, MAT pursued USG and host country objectives to establish a safe, secure environment and promote conditions for economic growth. The MAT mission was to:

- Provide startup assistance to the new GOH ministries using CA technical advisers to perform initial assessments and assist in organizational planning.
- Recommend strategies that would facilitate links with USAID and other long-term development assistance providers.

Thirty-four CA professionals were assigned. In civilian life they were urban development specialists, environmental scientists, educators, engineers, doctors, lawyers, bankers, business leaders and law enforcement experts. For more than five months, the MAT soldiers devoted their years of experience in private practice, law enforcement and government work to restarting and reforming the GOH. They completed assessment of 12 ministries, including justice, finance and banking, commerce, education, foreign affairs, agriculture, health, public works and interior.

From October 1994 through February 1995, the first MAT—MATI—provided organizational assistance and prepared technical assessments and plans that:

- Determined priorities.
- Completed funding projections.
- Defined GOH interministerial tasks and US Interagency Task Force (IATF) tasks.
- Facilitated continuity and handoff.

With their civilian expertise and military capabili-

CA can spot the NGOs and PVOs that have staying power and the competence to manage a CA project. USAID and FNs can then support NGO and PVO implementation. This interplay of CA project design, NGO or PVO implementation and USAID funding and oversight has yet to be fully appreciated, but it is clearly [an] effective way to use all resources.

ties, the MATs supported the US civilian agencies in missions that those agencies were not designed to accomplish alone. While CA cooperation was clearly desirable in this working relationship, it was never intended as an equal partnership.⁶ Department of State (DOS) was the lead agency, and by law, the military was not allowed to spend money on foreign aid projects as USAID did.⁷ The MAT advisers contributed without controlling and did not get involved in running the government. The MAT limited the scope of its missions and managed both GOH and civilian agency expectations so as not to displace their primary responsibilities.

But the military was needed in Haiti long after DOS and USAID resumed their agency programs. This became necessary because the end state in Haiti was stability, and this would not happen without continued military involvement. Author Jennifer L. McCoy stated: “For two hundred years, Haiti endured a classic predatory state. The state preyed on its people without providing political or economic goods. Lacking accountability, governments used their power in a negative manner to destroy rather than create. . . . To dismantle the predatory state and create a democratic one requires . . . a universal respect for the rule of law. The underlying problem in Haiti is that the judicial system is completely dysfunctional and distrusted by people and that the security provided by the [Multinational Force] MNF and [UN Mission in Haiti] UNMIH . . . is artificial.”⁸

Stability is achieved by establishing a safe, secure environment and promoting conditions for economic

growth. To achieve stability in Haiti and elsewhere, “there will be longer periods of US military engagement before an operation is transferred to civilian agencies.”⁹ Law and order are the essence of security and a prerequisite of military and political legitimacy.¹⁰ A safe, secure environment means that law and order has prevailed. Law and order are achieved when the police, courts and prisons are competent, honest and subordinate to civilian control. Haiti had a long way to go. To achieve stability, Haiti had to be able to maintain law and order. It had to allow and encourage its people to prosper. Haiti had to provide government services, and it had to govern for the benefit of the governed.

MAT's Relation to Tactical CA

The civil-military operations center (CMOC) was responsible for CA programs involving the military. The CMOC received all requests for military assistance from foreign nationals. It validated requests for military assistance. It then matched each request to military capabilities and converted the request into tasks. CA action officers considered the labor, facilities, materials, skills and funding available from one of the following:

- Host nations (HNs).
- Nongovernment organizations (NGOs).
- Private volunteer organizations (PVOs).
- Donor nations.
- US civilian agencies.
- US military.

Analyzing capabilities and interfacing with organizations and agencies define civil-military operations. The CMOC, located in the headquarters, stays in close contact with the J3 and J4 to clarify military capabilities and define tasks.

A separate CA center was created during Operation *Uphold Democracy*. The humanitarian assistance coordination center (HACC) differed from the CMOC in that the HACC was the principal point of contact for NGOs and PVOs. The HACC tapped into the NGOs and PVOs experiences, capabilities and broader insights into Haiti's needs. Without authority over civilians, the HACC served as a liaison with NGOs. The HACC led by persuasion and by coordinating efforts to obtain results. It was located in the generally accessible USAID building, a non-military location familiar to NGO personnel that dispelled appearances of military control. The MAT worked closely with the CMOC and HACC to add military capability to all other elements of assistance, making the most sense in terms of HN aid and development.



MAT soldiers from the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command meet with the US Ambassador to Haiti, the Honorable William Lacy Swing.

With their civilian expertise and military capabilities, the MATs supported the US civilian agencies in missions that those agencies were not designed to accomplish alone. While CA cooperation was clearly desirable in this working relationship, it was never intended as an equal partnership. Department of State was the lead agency, and by law, the military was not allowed to spend money on foreign aid projects as USAID did.

Common Elements of MAT Assistance

Initially, the MAT held coordination meetings with USAID and the US Embassy. The meetings were held with the GOH ministers to confirm their interest in having advisers. The advisers started by conducting initial assessments and identifying interim tasks. While working on interim tasks, they developed long-term strategies for USAID/USG and UN assistance. They coordinated with NGOs and PVOs to avoid redundancy. At tour's end, the advisers prepared leave-behind plans with appropriate hand-off and final reports and briefings. The ministerial advisers structured their analysis of the ministries on:

- The ministry's operational capabilities.
- Ministry organization, administration and management.
- Funding and budget.

Haiti needed everything. All ministries had a low or nonexistent level of service, decayed infrastructure and virtually no organization or financial management. The GOH had been disorganized, corrupt, inactive and incompetent. Jean-Bertrand Aristide's administration, which followed, bore the same char-

acteristics. Even so, the advisers found a mix of capable, enthusiastic reformers at various levels, but their efforts were individualized, uncoordinated and unsupported. The reformers welcomed MAT assistance and the opportunity for reform. The personal contact with the CA MAT experts gave the reformers heart and energy to initiate change, but change was slow in coming. The key to success lay in sustainment and follow-up after the MAT advisers left. MAT advisers returned on subsequent missions and found exhausted reformers replaced with loyalists, reform legislation paralyzed, and continued corruption and self-interest.

From February 1995 onward, the US military's role subsided as UNMIH stood up. The USAID programs for judicial supervision and training had matured. Was there any appropriate role left for the military to perform? If so, it was to support the DOS and USAID in a manner that recognized their predominant role and responsibilities. The military's status as a junior partner in this relationship did not have sufficient definition or guidelines. Within the Department of Defense (DOD), there was debate



A typical Justice of the Peace building in Haiti.

[MAT] information became the basis for the USAID projects and plans for judicial training and mentoring teams. The first MAT in Haiti—MAT I—determined the interoperability of the police, courts and prisons. These three form a triad that is the heart of any criminal justice system. The triad acted on citizen complaints, investigated crimes, issued arrest warrants and decided the disposition of cases. The information collected was distilled into a matrix of indicators gauging the performance of the judicial system.

on what that role should be, based on the following criteria:

- Unique skills and experience of Reserve and Active Component personnel, especially CA.
- Military capabilities beyond that of civilian agencies (logistics, transportation, soldier skills and especially CA with its in-depth civilian expertise).
- Utility as a military training mission.
- Value to GOH in its recovery effort.
- Accomplishing US foreign policy objectives.

MAT's Role in Interagency Operations

DOS is the lead agency in implementing US foreign policy.¹¹ USAID is responsible for project development that accomplishes foreign policy objectives. USAID can determine priorities by exercising its power to fund or not to fund. The goals of these two agencies might not be the same; in fact, they might conflict with open or hidden agendas of other IATF participants. The military is a junior partner in this setting and has no command or control authority over IATF participants. CA is the military's ex-

ecutive agent in engaging HN officials to support IATF programs.

Uncoordinated, these differing sources of aid can flow downriver in a torrent of lost energy and diluted effort. Unfocused, the project accomplishments have a shotgun effect—many scattered hits but no real impact. The military does not fund programs but must quietly assert itself by employing underused resources to achieve HN strategic objectives.

Because the US military knows which US, foreign nation (FN), NGO and PVO resources are available, it can recommend, without usurping the IATF, courses of action to develop a strategic plan for the minister to adopt. The strategic plan can apply these resources to long-term development of the HN infrastructure and human resources.

Besides being a quiet reconciler on the IATF, MATs can do more than give advice and assistance, even though constrained from spending military money. MATs can envision long-term projects that fit IATF strategic plans, but usually CA soldiers are

in country for short tours only. Suitable NGOs and PVOs are long-term entities that can implement and manage projects. CA can spot the NGOs and PVOs that have staying power and the competence to manage a CA project. USAID and FNs can then support NGO and PVO implementation. This interplay of CA project design, NGO or PVO implementation and USAID funding and oversight has yet to be fully appreciated, but it is clearly a more effective way to use all resources.

MAT projects must be short-term and achievable within limited deployment timeframes, and they must deliver something meaningful that develops Haiti's ability to provide government services. MAT managed the GOH ministers' expectations in understanding US military capabilities. The contributions MAT missions made, both as IATF participants and as ministerial advisers, were enormous. MATs helped the HN ministries develop confidence, capabilities and realistic plans. MAT missions were valuable in helping US policy makers avoid war and maintain stability.¹²

The Ministries

Justice. US officials saw an administration of justice as key to a safe, secure environment in Haiti. MAT advisers completed magistrate and prison assessments. Their information became the basis for the USAID projects and plans for judicial training and mentoring teams. The first MAT in Haiti—MAT I—determined the interoperability of the police, courts and prisons. These three form a triad that is the heart of any criminal justice system. The triad acted on citizen complaints, investigated crimes, issued arrest warrants and decided the disposition of cases. The information collected was distilled into a matrix of indicators gauging the performance of the judicial system. The teams' observations laid the foundation for later missions.

From February to May 1995, a second MAT—MAT II—deployed to Haiti to focus specifically on the judiciary. MAT II's mission was to assist the GOH in assessing the judicial system, identifying weaknesses, recommending solutions and where possible, helping to implement improvements and reforms. In concept, MAT II served as the bridge between the USG and the Haitian Ministry of Justice (MOJ) as USAID and the ambassador's IATF-Justice brought programs on line.

Succeeding MATs deployed to Haiti through March 1997 to develop long-term strategies for the MOJ inspector general and customs. This continued the momentum of judicial reform consistent with

US Army



An agronomist from the 351st Civil Affairs Command and Haitian Ministry of Interior officials on an erosion prevention project.

Haiti needed everything. All ministries had a low or nonexistent level of service, decayed infrastructure and virtually no organization or financial management. The GOH had been disorganized, corrupt, inactive and incompetent. Jean-Bertrand Aristide's administration, which followed, bore the same characteristics. Even so, the advisers found a mix of capable, enthusiastic reformers at various levels.

both the ambassador's priorities and the military mission to establish a safe environment. MAT-J's low-key presence in the Haitian ministries and in the countryside promoted the rule of law, judicial vitality and government stability without appearing to be an occupation force. In doing so, it helped dismantle the predatory state and break up the cycle of retribution and violence that Haiti has experienced throughout its history.

Public works. The task of assessing the deficiencies of Haiti's national infrastructure was massive due to long-term neglect. Facility assessments focused on Port-au-Prince urban planning, roadway maintenance, water treatment, port operation and funding. During the Ministry of Public Works' initial assessment, it discovered that many other organizations had conducted studies and made recommen-

dations to improve Haiti's infrastructure; however, funding to implement the programs was lacking. Most of the budget paid for salaries instead of capital improvements. Although the UN Development Program identified specific projects, it was questionable

Any rehabilitation program must include appropriate design and construction of drainage and procedures for overweight trucks. While heavy trucks cause more road damage than autos, weight is only part of the problem. Without proper drainage, a small pothole widens quickly and threatens the road's structural integrity. . . . As the road network develops, regular inspections, clean culverts and quick repairs are essential to prevent small problems from becoming large ones.

whether the associated budgets provided adequate funding. The MAT recommended priorities, but the GOH did not develop any specific plan to determine which areas should be focused on first.

The national major port facility in Port-au-Prince remains the single largest revenue producer in the country, with ships paying the highest import fees in the Western Hemisphere. It is corrupt throughout. Analysis of port operations focused on infrastructure improvements, work rules, and management, and in January 1997, MAT VI examined the customs function.

MAT V operated from June to September 1996, working with the Ministry of Public Works, Transportation and Communication, the Ministry of Environment and the presidential adviser for infrastructure. MAT V advised the GOH on selecting landfill sites, collecting waste and managing traffic, which included installing traffic lights, establishing traffic patterns and operating weigh stations. The team also helped to develop motor pool operations and equipment maintenance. Liaison was maintained with the US Embassy and USAID. The team's plan for accomplishing public works projects over the next five years included:

- Potable water systems.
- Landfill development and management/trash collection.
- A garbage truck motor pool.
- A functional fire-fighting system.
- Permanent truck weigh stations.
- Infrastructure.
- Recycling operations.
- Port-au-Prince beltway.

However, due to lack of resources, the GOH has shifted its emphasis from developing new landfill sites to extending the life of the existing one. Limited progress has been made in this area and in highway management. Planning for highway weigh stations has begun, but any rehabilitation program must include appropriate design and construction of drainage and procedures for overweight trucks. While heavy trucks cause more road damage than autos, weight is only part of the problem. Without proper drainage, a small pothole widens quickly and threatens the road's structural integrity. Beyond road rehabilitation, regular road maintenance also needs to be addressed. As the road network develops, regular inspections, clean culverts and quick repairs are essential to prevent small problems from becoming large ones.

Public health. The public health adviser found the Ministry of Health in chaos. The health care system had deteriorated, and Haitians' health situation was catastrophic. Eighty percent of the medical equipment was not operational; infant mortality rate was at least 15 percent by age five. NGOs and PVOs provided humanitarian assistance. Advice to the ministry focused on immediate biomedical equipment repair, a management vision and plans to provide essential services. A proposal for training GOH biomedical equipment technicians was completed and later implemented. The Pan American Health Organization funded five candidates who were later trained in the United States.

The MAT adviser assessed Haitian health facilities located outside Port-au-Prince. He helped identify and resupply critical medical supplies, inspected food processing plants and dairies, and stored and distributed veterinary and other critical vaccines. The most critical issue was the total lack of trained biomedical repair technicians and repair parts for medical equipment. Nearly all parts were donated, and equipment often arrived dismantled without manuals or trained personnel to assemble it. Testing and calibration equipment was nonexistent.

The municipal water supply in Haiti was near total failure. Underground distribution pipes were contaminated, and health facilities stored water in unsterilized concrete or fiberglass cisterns. Municipal sewage disposal was open-culvert and gravity-operated, a design that poses serious public health problems.

Commerce. The MAT commerce team advised GOH's Ministry of Commerce and Tourism from October 1994 through September 1996. In MAT I, the team worked at the highest levels of the GOH



Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham, commanding general 358th Civil Affairs Brigade, and Master Sergeant Serge Louseau of the 358th's public works team meet with the mayor of Port-au-Prince to discuss traffic control in the city.

The task of assessing the deficiencies of Haiti's national infrastructure was massive due to long-term neglect. Facility assessments focused on Port-au-Prince urban planning, roadway maintenance, water treatment, port operation and funding. During the Ministry of Public Works' initial assessment, it discovered that many other organizations had conducted studies and made recommendations to improve Haiti's infrastructure; however, funding to implement the programs was lacking. Most of the budget paid for salaries instead of capital improvements.

to bring together private-sector tourism with the government sector. They assisted in reestablishing the National Office of Tourism and in transitioning it into a cabinet-level department, the Secretary of State for Tourism. Additionally, the team readied the GOH for two important international conferences, the Summit of the Americas and the Caribbean Latin America Action Economic Conference. Haiti's successful participation in these events marked its re-emergence in the world economic arena.

In MAT II, the commerce team assisted the Secretary of State for Tourism in staffing and organizing that office, producing promotional materials and planning for Haiti to host the General Assembly of the Organization of American States. The team also assisted the US Embassy and the US Department of Commerce for Secretaries of Commerce trade mission to Haiti. In MAT V, the team again assisted the Ministry of Commerce and, with the assistance of Haiti's private-sector business organizations, pro-

duced a promotional videotape to boost Haitian exports and attract foreign investment.

International funding for developing projects and creating jobs has been frozen for more than two years because of the international community's demands for economic reform and for privatizing Haiti's nationalized industries. Consequently, growth in investment, employment and trade has been minimal. The Ministry of Commerce and the Secretary of State for Tourism remain hampered by a lack of vision, organization and resources. Increasing commerce and tourism is best achieved by private enterprise, not government programs.

Finance and Central Bank. MAT I prepared the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank for evaluation by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The team found that the GOH needed to modernize its financial systems and increase tax collections, which had decreased during the previous few years. MAT advisers recommended that Central Bank improve

the currency in circulation and government check-cashing procedures, but later MATs found little improvement. By 1996, the international community was withholding assistance from Haiti until the government demonstrated its ability to increase tax rev-

Animal health directly impacted public health and the economic well-being of Haitian farm families. Humans can contract anthrax, which is endemic in large areas of Haiti, directly from infected animals, contaminated animal products or environmental contamination from spores. . . . [CA veterinarians] formulated proposals for training lab technicians and establishing a diagnostic lab and began networking with NGOs and PVOs.

enues.

The *Direction Generale des Impots (DGI)* operates as a decentralized service of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. It collects all taxes except customs duties but is unable to determine the amount of revenue it should collect. The focus has been on building an audit capability and strengthening the *DGI's* stature through internal audit procedures.

Interior. Currently there is no emergency management system in Haiti. Should a catastrophe occur—category III hurricane or greater—the probability of significant loss of life and damage to property is great. Such an event could destabilize the entire government, thus negating US efforts.

When Tropical Storm Gordon struck Haiti on 12-13 November 1994, there was considerable loss of life and property. In response, MAT advisers devised an intensive training effort in nine department capitals and six major population centers, an effort that most local officials supported. To date, 16 cities have participated in disaster preparedness training, seven cities have participated in two training sessions, and risk management surveys have been conducted for three. This awareness has resulted in the Organization of Pre-Disaster and Rescue's ability to alert departments of potential storm threats and, on one occasion, to deploy a small damage assessment team to an affected area. MAT worked to resolve the following issues:

- Coordination and control.
- Communications and alert notification of emergency personnel.
- Emergency public warning information systems.

- Evacuation and medical support.
- Search and rescue.
- Damage control.
- Law enforcement.
- Emergency management.
- Resource management.

MAT also worked to develop and promulgate the GOH National Emergency Plan and update the disaster preparedness planning database. This increased disaster awareness fostered dialogue among Haitian government entities, NGOs and PVOs; however, lack of funding and friction among local and national agencies has hurt participation.

Agriculture. The MAT advisers to the Ministry of Agriculture focused on reforestation and livestock. This mountainous country was largely deforested by overpopulation. Deforestation increased demand for firewood, the principal fuel source. Likewise, there is a limited agricultural base as the population has grown beyond environmental capacity. The upland forests are clear-cut, resulting in erosion of fertile soil.

The team facilitated a joint assessment of environmental needs among major contributors, project implementation groups and the Ministry of Agriculture. It recommended:

- Providing alternatives to clear-cutting.
- Preventing theft of remaining rain forest.
- Establishing sustainable agricultural practices.
- Preserving the watershed.

CA veterinarians found veterinary services almost nonexistent. The team formulated proposals for training lab technicians and establishing a diagnostic lab and began networking with NGOs and PVOs. The team proposed a cold-chain program to set up solar refrigerators in major cities to store vaccines. Animal health directly impacted public health and the economic well-being of Haitian farm families. Humans can contract anthrax, which is endemic in large areas of Haiti, directly from infected animals, contaminated animal products or environmental contamination from spores. A direct benefit of the cold-chain program was a lower incidence of communicable animal disease in the human population and increased economic gain for the animal owner.

When the MAT V agriculture team returned to Haiti in July through September 1996, it analyzed and updated animal vaccine programs for rabies, anthrax and brucellosis. Specifically, MAT V assisted the US Support Group—Haiti veterinarian with Operation Mad Dog II, a rabies vaccination program, and assisted in investigating pig mortality reports. It also identified engineering requirements

Infantrymen of the 3d Division advance cautiously through the devastated German city of Zweibrucken, 20 March 1945. US and British occupation forces had to manage nearly 6 million displaced persons from all over Europe in addition to over 11 million Germans expelled from Poland, Czechoslovakia and eastern Germany.



Why is this the military's job? President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to implement military government missions during World War II. At first, Roosevelt wanted civilian agencies to control conquered or liberated areas. After all, this appeared to be State Department business. However, the War Department persuaded Roosevelt that . . . only the US Army had the logistics to operate in devastated areas. Only soldiers could address issues that had both military and civilian implications. The mission was much larger and more complex than merely controlling or sustaining foreign civilians.

needed to rebuild selected irrigation systems. Finally, the team suggested ways to obtain veterinarian and technician training.

Foreign affairs. The MAT adviser helped devise a plan to resettle more than 100,000 migrants. The MAT also reviewed all treaties in force with the Dominican Republic. A ministry reorganization plan was drafted to establish regional hubs, a desk officer system, new administrative procedures and a foreign service institute equivalent. The minister's priorities were to reintegrate Haiti into the international community, improve its image abroad, promote foreign investment and negotiate agreements to conserve foreign exchange.

Education. Numerous private schools operate without government oversight. The MAT found that Haitians place a high cultural value on education and will pay for their children's tuition before they will buy food for themselves. At the same time, two of

three children do not go to school because there is no money. The best estimate of average income is \$300 per year; tuition is \$50 per year—this was a significant bar to individual initiative. There was an 80-percent illiteracy rate, and it has worsened. This ministry was new with little experience in public administration, but the minister and staff had educational expertise and a strong working relationship with USAID. The education advisers prepared a template for a national education inventory and a donor-beneficiary link with development organizations. The team implemented the inventory by conducting trips with the minister and staff to remote cities.

A Never-Ending Debate

Why is this the military's job? President Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to implement military government missions during World War II. At first, Roosevelt wanted civilian agencies to control conquered

or liberated areas. After all, this appeared to be State Department business. However, the War Department persuaded Roosevelt that civil affairs was Army business. The Army began training soldiers and recently inducted civilian specialists to be civil administrators. Experience in North African validated the need for experts with critical civilian skills, and more experts became soldiers because only the US

Haitians say, "How soon you want the troops to leave depends on how soon you want them to come back. . . . There is no quick fix in Haiti." . . . To the extent that a crisis is dynamic and fluid, political guidance aimed at achieving a solution may change to keep pace. This runs counter to traditional military thinking that commanders should receive clearly defined missions and be left to carry them out without changes from political authorities. Military thinking in stability operations like Haiti must account for the end state —stability.

Army had the logistics to operate in devastated areas. Only soldiers could address issues that had both military and civilian implications. The mission was much larger and more complex than merely controlling or sustaining foreign civilians. The Army could deploy such persons; civilian agencies could not. Necessity often determines policy; necessity prevailed, and the Army deployed military units.

This debate has repeated itself for every major deployment since World War II, but next time necessity might not determine policy. The executive branch will someday again direct the US military to "restore the legitimate government of . . ." or "establish a safe and secure environment and promote conditions for economic growth." Like it or not, the Army will comply. It will engage its CA experts to establish a stable government to avoid war. Military professionals should recognize that the CA mission is to provide stability until civilian agencies can establish their programs. The mission is coordinated with the objectives of the US Ambassador and USAID. CA operators do not work alone but work alongside NGOs and PVOs to develop the mission handoff to the civilian agencies. Thus, the CA mission does not duplicate or subsidize DOS or USAID efforts during the transition period.

Mission Creep versus Changing Mission

No other country has superpower or honest broker status. No other US government agency except

DOD has such a vast logistics base and broad spectrum of CA capabilities. In short, no one else can do the job. Writing for the *Wall Street Journal*, Carol Ann Robbins states: "The US public sees peace operations as a legitimate mission of the US military. Americans are willing to commit their diplomatic, political, and economic resources to help others. We proudly and readily allow our young sons and daughters in uniform to participate in humanitarian enterprises far from home. In no other way could the Somalis, for example, have been saved so quickly from starvation in 1992."¹³ The American public will not accept the military's claim that it is some other agency's job. The strategic politico-military end state of peace operations is stability, and if not achieved, the operation will ultimately fail even if military legitimacy is successful at the operational and tactical levels.

The end state in Haiti is stability. Clearly, Haiti is still not able to maintain stability. Haitians say, "How soon you want the troops to leave depends on how soon you want them to come back. You [the United States] are a country looking for a quick fix. There is no quick fix in Haiti."¹⁴ If Haiti were to fall apart, the American public would see the military effort, together with the efforts of the civilian agencies, as a failure.

In *Joint Force Quarterly*, Robert B. Oakley states: "There is no sign of diminution of the troubled state phenomenon. . . . The severe problems [of troubled states] threaten world stability . . . and more tangible US interests, including those of strategic importance. . . . The armed forces can anticipate being immersed in multinational, humanitarian and peace operations, though they may consider them as improper uses of resources or an unwelcome diversion from what they regard as more appropriate traditional [combat] military roles."¹⁵

In the July-August 1997 *Military Review*, several authors criticize the military because it treated stability operations as mission creep.¹⁶ Mission creep is portrayed as a negative phenomenon that can be eliminated through careful planning and analysis. There is some validity to this, but mission creep accrues more to logic of a dynamic situation in which the original mission's success depends on picking up additional missions. Poor staff work and capricious politicians are not always to blame—only reality and logic. To the extent that a crisis is dynamic and fluid, political guidance aimed at achieving a solution may change to keep pace. This runs counter to traditional military thinking that commanders should receive clearly defined missions and be

left to carry them out without changes from political authorities. Military thinking in stability operations like Haiti must account for the end state—stability.

General John J. Sheehan, US Marine Corps, stated: "We are entering an era in which a commander's understanding and ability to master the cultural, economic and political dimensions of a conflict or crisis is as important as mastering the traditional firepower solution. Ask any platoon or company leaders who served in . . . Bosnia or . . . in Haiti about what tools they used to succeed in those complex, multinational peace enforcement and peacekeeping situations. You will likely find that lethal weapons were only a small part of the total tool kit."¹⁷

The Army's CA branch is an ounce of preven-

The MAT found that Haitians place a high cultural value on education and will pay for their children's tuition before they will buy food for themselves. At the same time, two of three children do not go to school because there is no money. . . . There was an 80-percent illiteracy rate, and it has worsened.

tion. MAT missions cost less than conventional force deployments seeking the same objective. They involve fewer personnel and are an important tool for the commander to use to avoid war and maintain stability. It is the force to send to overcome the problems of a conventional mind-set. **MR**

NOTES

1. Bernard E. Trainor, "The Perfect War Led America's Military Astray," *The Wall Street Journal* (2 August 2000).
2. Colin Powell, *My American Journey* (New York: Random House, 1995), 602.
3. Rudolph C. Barnes Jr., *Military Legitimacy—Might and Right in the New Millennium* (Frank Cass & Co Ltd., 1996), 40 and 135 citing Andrew S. Natsios, "The International Humanitarian Response System," *Parameters* (Spring 1995), 68 and 79.
4. CA is divided into 20 functional specialties that are not equivalent to Active Component career specialties: civil defense, labor, economics and commerce, food and agriculture, property control, public communications, transportation, public works and utilities, public education, public finance, public health, public safety, public welfare, civilian supply, dislocated civilians, legal, civil information, arts and monuments, cultural affairs and public administration.
5. General Wayne H. Downing, then Commander, US Special Operations Command, "Joint Special Operations in Peace and War," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Summer 1995), 26.
6. Joint Publication 3-07, "Interagency Operations," *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 16 June 1995), IV-7.
7. United States Code, Title 10. For an examination of how commanders and units can deliver derivative benefits to local nationals while avoiding the misuse of operations funds, see Colonel Denise K. Vowell, *Military Review* (March-April 2000), 38.
8. Jennifer L. McCoy, "Haiti: Prospects for Political and Economic Reconstruction," World Peace Foundation Report No. 10 (November 1995), 1 and 19.
9. Robert B. Oakley, "Developing a Strategy for Troubled States," *Joint Force Quarterly* (Summer 1996), 83.
10. Barnes, 43.
11. This section was prepared substantially by James P. Smith, Esq., 426th CA Battalion who deployed on MATs I, II and III. See also Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, "Managing Complex Contingency Operations," which is designed to

- streamline interagency planning. The PDD's intent is to establish management practices and to achieve unity of effort among agencies of the US government and international organizations engaged in peace operations.
12. *US News & World Report*, 12 January 1998, "The Pentagon's strong role in domestic disaster training is drawing fire from civilian agencies. . . . With help from the FBI and other agencies, military specialists are training emergency workers in 120 cities to cope with an attack from biological, chemical, or nuclear weapons. But the training . . . has sparked conflicts over lines of authority. 'The military just doesn't understand the police and fire fighter worlds. . . . They don't even understand the federal civilian community. . . . They just charge ahead no matter what anyone says.' . . . DOD officials counter that they have the government's top expertise in coping with weapons of mass destruction and that's why Congress gave them a leadership role. But some officials may be going too far. After one field exercise, over enthusiastic DOD officers were bluntly reminded that they do not command civilian officials. Coordination of disaster training has now sparked an investigation by the General Accounting Office."
13. Powell, 605.
14. Carol Ann Robbins, *Wall Street Journal* (30 October 1996).
15. Oakley, 81 and 82.
16. Lawrence A. Yates, "Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes," *Military Review* (July-August 1997), 51, 52, 55 and 60. See also several articles appearing in the same issue detailing these criticisms throughout the Haitian and Bosnian operations: LTC Douglas Scalard, "When Doctrine Isn't Enough"; Robert F. Baumann, "Operation Uphold Democracy: Power Under Control"; John T. Fishel, "Operation Uphold Democracy—Old Principles, New Realities"; and Congressman Ike Skelton, "The Constitutional Role of Congress: Lessons in Unpreparedness."
17. General John J. Sheehan, US Marine Corps, formerly Commander, US Atlantic Command, Remarks to Naval Institute Symposium (4 September 1996), 3 and 4.

Brigadier General Bruce B. Bingham, US Army Reserve, is commander of the US Army Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne), Fort Bragg, North Carolina. He received a B.A. from Rutgers College and an M.P.P.M. from Yale. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army War College. He previously commanded the 358th CA Brigade, Norristown, Pennsylvania and served as the CA adviser to the commander in chief, US Atlantic Command (ACOM), for the Haiti intervention. He instituted the Ministerial Advisory Team (MAT) mission concept with the US ACOM, pioneered its implementation and commanded the first MAT in Haiti. He is also a partner with BDO Seidman, LLP, in New York City.

Colonel Michael J. Cleary, US Army Reserve, is the deputy brigade commander, 358th CA Brigade. He received a B.A. from LaSalle College, an M.A. from Villanova University and a J.D. from Delaware Law School. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He previously commanded the Combined Joint Civil Military Task Force in Bosnia and served as a civil affairs staff officer during the Haiti assistance mission. He also served on the MAT as a ministry of justice advisor during Operation Uphold Democracy. He subsequently deployed to Haiti and served on MATs II, III and IV; later commanding MAT V and VI.

Colonel Daniel L. Rubini, US Army, Retired, is currently a US administrative law judge, Office of Hearings and Appeals, Social Security Administration, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. He received a B.A. from Virginia Polytechnic Institute and a J.D. from Temple University Law School. He is a graduate of the US Army Command and General Staff College. He served as advisor to the Kuwait Ministry of Justice during Operation Desert Shield and as a ministry of justice advisor during Operation Uphold Democracy. He later served on MAT missions II, III, V and VI.