

## Mentoring: Building a Legacy

Colonel Jack D. Kem, U.S. Army, Retired

Mentoring is capturing the attention of many in the military today. Therefore, the new generation of Army leaders should master the latest mentoring techniques. Fortunately, no one has a solid idea of what mentoring really is, so it is possible to pick and choose from a variety of techniques for the one best suited for participants' personalities and ambitions. Proper mentoring allows people to get ahead and make names for themselves. And not only is mentoring fun, it can pay off.

*Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary* gives two definitions for the word "mentor." The first is, "a friend of Odysseus entrusted with the education of Odysseus' son Telemachus. The second is, "A trusted counselor or guide, tutor, coach."<sup>1</sup>

From a mentoring standpoint, you should remember the three characters in the story about Odysseus and Mentor. The first is Odysseus, also known as Ulysses; the second is his son, Telemachus; and the third is the goddess Minerva, who takes the form of Mentor. Odysseus, who is joining the Greeks to bring back Helen from far-off Troy, is worried about leaving Telemachus. So, Odysseus asks Mentor to watch over Telemachus. Mentor takes the job seriously: "In the meantime I will go to Ithaca, to put heart into Ulysses' son Telemachus; I will embolden him to call the Achaeans in assembly, and speak out to the suitors of his mother Penelope, who persist in eating up any number of his sheep and oxen; I will also conduct him to Sparta and to Pylos, to see if he can hear anything about the return of his dear father—for this will make people speak well of him."<sup>2</sup>

Odysseus trusted Mentor to educate Telemachus. There was no established reciprocal relationship that

Mentor and Telemachus had developed over time. The relationship was assigned, and Telemachus did not, at first, know of it.

Consider the following quote, which illustrates the development of the relationship between Mentor and Telemachus, with Mentor clearly playing the role of the coach: "Minerva [Mentor] led the way and Telemachus followed her. Presently she said, 'Telemachus, you must not be in the least shy or nervous; you have taken this voyage to try and find out where your father is buried and how he came by his end; so go straight up to Nestor that we may see what he has got to tell us. Beg of him to speak the truth, and he will tell no lies, for he is an excellent person.'

"'But how, Mentor,' replied Telemachus, 'dare I go up to Nestor, and how am I to address him? I have never yet been used to holding long conversations with people, and am ashamed to begin questioning one who is so much older than myself.'

"'Some things, Telemachus,' answered Minerva, 'will be suggested to you by your own instinct, and heaven will prompt you further; for I am assured that the gods have been with you from the time of your birth until now.'<sup>3</sup>

Minerva is clever. She has taught Telemachus all kinds of things, and now she wants him to acknowledge these things as instinct. Properly coached and taught, protégés can also learn how to act. A good mentor will convince them that their actions are a result of their own ideas, their own instincts.

### Army Doctrine

Even fewer people read Army doctrine than read the classics, but that is where Army mentors should look for guidance. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Army Leader-*

*ship*, states, "Mentoring is the proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity. Mentoring is an inclusive process [not an exclusive one] for everyone under a leader's charge. . . . Mentoring is totally inclusive, real-life leader development for *every* subordinate. Because leaders don't know which of their subordinates today will be the most significant contributors and leaders in the future, they strive to provide *all* their subordinates with the knowledge and skills necessary to become the best they can be—for the Army and for themselves [emphasis added]."<sup>4</sup>

Note that the Army's doctrinal view is that leaders should mentor *everyone* under their charge. Of course, one of the big objections to this approach is that it is simply leadership not mentoring. Real leadership is more than just mentoring, but mentoring certainly falls within the scope of good, old-fashioned leadership. FM 22-100 further defines mentoring by clearly stating the three components of Army mentoring—teaching, developmental counseling, and coaching: "Mentoring links operating leader actions to improving leader actions. When you mentor, you take the observing, assessing, and evaluating you do when you operate and apply these actions to developing individual subordinates. Mentoring techniques include teaching, developmental counseling, and coaching."<sup>5</sup> The definitions of the three major mentoring components follow:

□ Teaching gives knowledge or provides skills to others, causing them to learn by example or experience.

□ Developmental counseling is subordinate-centered communication that produces a plan that outlines the actions necessary for subordinates to take to achieve individual or organizational goals.

□ Coaching involves leaders assessing performance based on observations, helping subordinates develop an effective plan of action to sustain strengths and overcome weaknesses; and supporting subordinates and their plans.

Army doctrine states that leaders are to mentor everyone under their charge and that mentoring includes teaching, coaching, and counseling. FM 22-100 also states that mentoring is critical: "Mentoring isn't something new for the Army. Past successes and failures can often be traced to how seriously those in charge took the challenge of developing future leaders. As you consider the rapid pace of change in today's world, it's *critical* that you take the time to develop leaders capable of responding to that change [emphasis added]. The success of the next generation of Army leaders depends on how well you accept the responsibility of mentoring your subordinates. Competent and confident leaders trained to meet tomorrow's challenges and fight and win future conflicts will be your legacy."<sup>6</sup>

## Types of Mentors

There are four basic types of mentoring relationships. Each has advantages and disadvantages that allow enormous flexibility in choosing the type of mentoring that best fits the personalities involved.

**The ce-mentor relationship.** This relationship provides the three components of Army mentoring for all subordinates. Its focus, creating a solid foundation for the future, occurs while the subordinate is under the mentor's charge. The relationship does not have to be long term, but it can develop into a long-term relationship if that is desired. This is simply good leadership that develops subordinates for the long term.

There are advantages and disadvantages of the ce-mentor relationship that depend on perspective and motivation. Properly done, the ce-mentor relationship not only makes

units better but also makes the whole Army better. Developmental counseling looks beyond the parameters of performance counseling—the current rating period or a recent event. Developmental counseling should also look at the whole person rather than just at the person's performance. Teaching and coaching do not focus solely on behaviors and actions. They focus on understanding and applying principles.

The ce-mentor relationship applies to everyone, not just favorites. At the beginning, the relationship might not be reciprocal; some do not really want any help in their development. Over time, leaders can expect subordinates to accept comments, but there will always be some that are not receptive, even to constructive comments. The mentor must set a good example, but does not need to be perfect. Yet, if he expects others to improve, he will have to display in himself the same openness to change and improvement.

Ce-mentors will care about their people. They will see their protégés' potential and help them realize that potential. There is little personal glory in a ce-mentor relationship. A great ce-mentor relationship will produce more competent leaders for the future rather than create disciples of different leaders. The ce-mentor relationship is a short-term relationship with a long-term focus.

**The com-mentor relationship.** This style of mentoring is the standard. The com-mentor relationship is a reciprocal relationship that endures over time. Some mentor-protégé relationships seem to click, and both sides continue to share thoughts and ideas. This can be a result of the ce-mentor relationship, but it does not have to be. Under the com-mentor relationship, the protégé does not have to be in the mentor's rating scheme. It may even be advantageous for the com-mentor to be outside the rating chain to serve as a sounding board.

The com-mentor is not a sugar daddy. He provides sage advice and direction, and does not get the protégé a plum job or make things happen for the protégé. A good com-mentor provides advice, offers in-

sight, and lays out options at various decision points so the protégé can make informed decisions.

Much like a good ce-mentor, the com-mentor might have to exert a little tough love—be frank and honest. I write to a couple of com-mentors a few times a year to ask for advice. Sometimes they do not give me the answer I think is best, but they always offer what they think will be best for me in the long term. This tough love and honesty takes some getting used to, but it is valuable.

The com-mentor relationship is rather unique. Many protégés are fortunate to have two or three com-mentors to call on when they need advice or when they need someone to listen to them. Both the com-mentor and the protégé must work at this relationship to keep channels open. Like the ce-mentor, a good com-mentor must set a good example, be receptive to improvement, and care about the protégé. This relationship works best when it is kept personal and private; it is not the best way to create an army of disciples. The com-mentor relationship is a long-term relationship with a long-term focus.

**The tor-mentor relationship.** The tor-mentor relationship is the standard sugar-daddy type of mentoring that many speak of with disdain but secretly desire for themselves. Both protégé and mentor torment one another with demands on the other. Demands that enhance their respective careers. This type of mentoring does not have to be reciprocal as long as neither member severs the relationship. In fact, either party can be the real tor-mentor. There are two variants of this type of mentoring.

The *coattail tor-mentor* is that great sugar-daddy relationship whereby the protégé knows someone senior who can make things happen. As long as the mentor can make things happen, the relationship is cultivated and maintained. The mentor might become irritated by this, but that is immaterial to the protégé as long as the mentor does not end the relationship. The fact that the relationship is irritating can work to the coattail tor-mentor's advantage; he might get what he wants just so he quits calling the to-mentor. This type

of relationship could backfire, however, so a good, self-serving coattail tor-mentor must artfully manage the relationship and only ask for favors the mentor can deliver quickly.

The *reachback tor-mentor* chooses favorites to help or uses pre-positioning to build his team for success at every assignment. The reachback tor-mentor offers help on assignments, even when help is not needed or desired. This is great for building a legacy. Protégés travel the road to success because of the mentor. If a mentor adopts this type of mentoring, he has little fear of his protégés severing ties because he is, after all, senior in this relationship. The key is to find great protégés and then help them as much as possible. If the protégés join the tor-mentor's team and join in every assignment, the mentor can "ride those horses" all the way to his own success.

Both tor-mentor relationships are great for building a legacy. The mentor really does not need to worry about setting an example or care about the protégés' development. The mentor's success is measured by getting things done now. To deflect criticism for using protégés in the tor-mentor relationship, the mentor can cite mission accomplishment. Who can argue with that? The tor-mentor relationship is a long-term relationship with a short-term focus.

**The de-mentor relationship.** This is arguably not a type of mentoring at all, but it passes as mentoring in many circles. In this relationship, all the right words are spoken with the proper enthusiasm to indicate mentoring is taking place. Both the mentor and the protégé go through the motions of proper mentoring, but the de-mentor relationship has no substance and no impact except for using the right buzzwords such as "established a highly successful, proactive mentoring program within the unit" prominently in efficiency reports.

One of the pitfalls of a de-mentor program is that it is relatively easy to identify. Units that have great buzzwords and slogans are particularly prone to having de-mentor programs. I have always been suspect of units that prominently post "Mission

First—People Always" as their slogan. What happens when the mission and people are not compatible? For example, what happens when troops go to Bosnia for yet another rotation and divorce rates in the unit climb? The reality might be "Mission First—People Best We Can."

But the de-mentor relationship and even slogans can affect the Army positively. Someone might listen to the words and think about them. Somewhere down the road those words might take root and gain some substance. The de-mentor relationship is a short-term program with a short-term focus.

There are other mentoring programs worthy of note, although they are not as common as the main four styles. Still, they have pockets of support. The first is the *dor-mentor* relationship. This is the "bolt from the blue" relationship in which either the protégé or mentor contacts the other after an extended dormant period. This commonly happens immediately after the release of a promotion list. It is difficult to characterize this type of mentoring as positive or negative because it can be either. However, a de-mentor relationship is a poor substitute for either the com-mentor or ce-mentor relationship.

There is also the *la-mentor* relationship. This is the typical pity-party relationship. Anyone can find fault with something in the Army, but it is unfortunate when leaders get caught up in it. This type of relationship is highly contagious.

Last is the *fo-mentor* relationship. Charging windmills like Don Quixote, fo-mentors take on the institution by inciting and rousing others to change for change's sake. Sometimes an in-

stitution needs major changes. However, the need for change easily can be overdone by rushing into emotionalism.

Each person should look closely at his definition of mentoring and how he approaches the development of subordinates. The Army needs its leaders to be ce-mentors to develop a solid foundation for tomorrow's leaders. Leaders need to cultivate com-mentors for themselves and to be available to others. Teaching, developmental counseling, and coaching are elements of good leadership, but are they practiced daily?

Good leadership requires setting the example and being willing to look inward and improve. Good leadership requires truly caring about soldiers and looking beyond short-term requirements. The right kind of mentoring can produce a real legacy—competent, capable leaders for tomorrow. **MR**

#### NOTES

1. Meriam-Webster, *Meriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary*, 10th ed. (Springfield, MA: Meriam-Webster, Inc., 1998), 726.
2. Homer, *The Odyssey*, trans., Samuel Butler, Book I, The Internet Classics Archive (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology) on-line at <<http://classics.mit.edu/Homer/odyssey.html>>.
3. *Ibid.*, Book III.
4. U.S. Army Field Manual 22-100, *Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1999), para 5-83.
5. *Ibid.*, para 5-85.
6. *Ibid.*, para 5-100.

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## Hamas, Understanding the Organization

Lieutenant Commander Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, U.S. Navy

In *Darb Al-Ashwaak: Hamas, Al-Intifada, Al-Sultah* (Pinprick Strikes: Hamas, the Intifadah and Leadership), (Dar-al-Shirook Press, Nablus, Gaza and Ramalah, translated by Youssef H. Aboul-Enein, 2002), Emaad Abdul-Hameed Al-Falooji gives Middle Eastern readers a comprehensive history of Hamas from its founding in 1987 to the organization's current operational procedures. The book, which brings to light the history, strategy, and tactics of the Palestinian militant group Hamas, details how terrorists use urban populations as a base of operations and support.

Al-Falooji, a former member of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, became a senior adviser to Hamas, but left the organization in 1996 to participate in Palestinian elections, becoming the Minister of Post and Telecommunications in the Palestinian Authority.

Al-Harakah Al-Muqawama Al-Islamiya (the Islamic Resistance Movement, known by the acronym Hamas), was established in Gaza on 14 December 1987 during the Palestinian uprising, Intifadah. The organization grew out of the Palestinian chapter of the Muslim Brotherhood as a means of channeling the rage and efforts of the first Intifadah toward the liberation of all Palestine and the creation of an Islamic state in its place.

Unlike other Palestinian groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine or the murderous Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Hamas is modeled heavily on the Muslim Brotherhood. The organization has created a community that has social services, schools, and healthcare, while maintaining military wings that carry out suicide bombings. Other Palestinian terrorist groups simply conduct violence without understanding or coordinating the social needs of the population they claim

to defend. The Hamas tactic offers a quasi-state and helps endear the population to Hamas, as well as providing a source of recruitment.

### Recruiting Methods

Hamas pays close attention to the recruitment of its members and is alert to any penetration by Israeli agents or rival Palestinian groups. During the early years, there was an intense dislike between Hamas and Yasser Arafat's Fatah group, because Arafat sought to undermine those organizations that undercut its legitimacy to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people. Hamas used the Muslim Brotherhood as a model for recruitment and promotion to fill its membership.

A prospective member of Hamas must first attempt to observe all the required Muslim prayers of the day. Once the member's transformation and sincerity in observing Islamic rituals is satisfactory to the recruiters, he is brought into a small usra (family) that monitors the person's spiritual progress. At this stage, recruits typically learn two sections of the *Quran* (Amaa and Tabarak) and learn selected hadiths (prophetic sayings). In addition, the recruit is introduced to the Muslim Brotherhood ideology of takfir (excommunication), the need to isolate oneself from sin, and to the jihad as a means of warfare. Not everyone successfully completes the indoctrination period, which lasts 18 months. However, if the person does succeed, he becomes an operative member and is assigned to a membership cell. During the indoctrination period, the recruit is assessed for skills, leadership potential, and ability within the membership cell. Based on his evaluation, and if he shows leadership abilities, he is given further training, designated a full member, and assigned as a captain or lieutenant.

### Hamas Organization

Hamas consists of five major jihaaaz (apparatus).

**The Al-Ahdaath (Events) Apparatus.** The Events Apparatus is responsible for coordinating events on the street, organizing turnouts for demonstrations, funerals of martyrs, and commemorations of special events. Al-Ahdaath produces leaflets and flyers to keep Palestinian communities informed of what is going on and enforces strikes that have been called by Hamas or Yasser Arafat's Fatah movement. It also provides first aid to Palestinians participating in street agitation. By acting as the eyes of Hamas leaders, Al-Ahdaath reports street developments and mass protests to help leaders decide what level of escalation to employ.

**The Al-Ilaami (Media) Apparatus.** The Media Apparatus monitors the international media to gauge what effect mass demonstrations and suicide bombings have on Arab and world public opinion. Al-Ilaami produces all internal publications for its members, and it prepares reports and lessons-learned on operations and certain studies commissioned by Hamas leadership. Al-Ilaami issues communiqués to the worldwide media, with an emphasis on perceived Israeli atrocities. It also trains a cadre of journalists who report for Hamas, its publications, and its website. Finally, Al-Ilaami monitors conferences to determine if they are of interest to the Hamas and whether to send delegations.

**The Al-Amn (Security) Apparatus.** The Security Apparatus is the key section responsible for preventing infiltration by Israeli agencies, informants, or Palestinian groups wanting to undermine Hamas. Al-Amn develops detailed security plans and trains members in operational security; conducts background checks on all

those wishing to join the movement; and undertakes surveillance of suspected collaborators and Palestinians who are contacted by the Israelis. In addition, Al-Amn reconnoiters Israeli forces, looking for movement of their units and troop concentrations; monitors the activity of Hamas cells and other divisions of the organization; and collects intelligence on other Palestinian liberation movements. It provides protection of the movement's leaders and assesses what information Israeli sweeps and detention of Hamas members might have compromised.

**The Al-Askary (Military) Apparatus.** Sheikh Ahmed Yasin, the spiritual founder of Hamas, proposed the need to establish a military wing that would reach beyond organizing strikes and orchestrating street violence. He gave the task to Sheikh Salaah Muhammad Shehaada, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike on 23 July 2002. Shehaada had organized the first military cell, called Al-Mujahiddon Al-Filasteeneen (the Palestinian Mujahideen). The book lacks details on this event, but it does say that Fatah militants released from Israeli jails were recruited to form the organization's military wing. Shehaada proposed the establishment of 12 military groups, each consisting of three to five people geographically dispersed throughout the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In addition to the 12 groups, five groups were held in reserve in case a cell was discovered. The groups were trained in firearms, demolitions, kidnapping, and suicide missions. Each cell carried out one military operation a month, allowing Hamas to undertake 12 operations a year, giving each cell a 1-year rotation to plan, train, rehearse, and recruit for an operation. The group conducted training on purchased land with underground training sites and firing ranges.

When the group first solicited funding from outside sources, funding was initially denied because of the fear that Israel would conduct a retaliatory strike after the group's first mission was carried out. This created a source of tension between Al-Falooji and the foreign government representative who was sent to dis-

cuss the formation of a military apparatus.

Al-Falooji highlights four major objectives of the armed wing of Hamas:

- To conduct painful strikes within Israel to ensure the Israeli government knows there are consequences to attacking Palestinian civilians.

- To conduct military operations to attract the attention of the world and the United Nations to force a solution to the Palestinian problem.

- To conduct strikes to raise the morale of the Palestinian people and to assert its authority on the street.

- To conduct military strikes against the Israeli people to send the message that they have no place in Palestine and that they cannot easily attain the security they desire.

These goals define the types of targets Hamas would engage through suicide operations, guerrilla action, and terror campaigns.

**The Ansar (Helpers) Apparatus.** The Helpers Apparatus is best described as Palestinians who are not full members of Hamas but who can participate and assist in the movement's activities. Al-Falooji details three conditions to become a Helper of Hamas:

- Be supportive of Hamas doctrine and goals.

- Follow Islamic conduct and ideals.

- Undergo a security check to ensure the candidate is serious about becoming a member of the Helpers group.

Members of the Helpers eventually merge into the main membership. The main recruiting grounds for Helpers are high schools, colleges, and unions. Al-Falooji does not give details about how Helpers are given full membership, except that there was tension between the Helpers and full Hamas members until the issue of equality was resolved.

## Methods of Internal Communication

One of the more incredible parts of the book discusses how the organization developed operational security. Al-Falooji claims that operational security was developed by observing the KGB (the Soviet Secret Police and intelligence agency) and,

amazingly, from watching films. The author highlights the use of dead drops and ciphering.

One example of dead drops has the author requesting a Hamas member to go to a certain mosque, at a certain hour, wearing certain clothing, sitting in a certain area of the mosque, and sitting in a certain way. A question would be asked such as, "Excuse me, what time is it?" The response would be, "Our appointment is with heaven, God willing." The member would then surrender a sealed message. All these prearranged actions had to take place or the courier would calmly leave the mosque.

Al-Falooji details the Quranic cipher method of writing reports and messages, which involves a verse from the *Quran*. Ciphering methods use certain verses and only letters from these verses for encryption. Others include letters from verses numbered and used to encode messages. He claims that one of the most popular verses is number 29 of *Surat al-Fath*.

Al-Falooji's book is autobiographical and, therefore, contains many references to himself, his education, and his role in Hamas. And while the book argues the righteousness of the Islamist cause in liberating Palestine, it is an important contribution to understanding the inner workings of the Hamas organization. It also provides a historical look into how the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hamas reconciled their differences to pursue a common cause in dealing with Israel.

Such books as this, although in Arabic, can give military planners an understanding of the techniques of organized religious militant organizations. Those involved in intelligence, counterterrorism, and regional foreign area officers will appreciate Al-Falooji's book.

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# MR Book Reviews

**RIVER TOWN: Two Years on the Yangtze**, Peter Hessler, HarperCollins Publishers, NY, 2001, 402 pages, \$26.00.

After obtaining literature degrees at Princeton and Oxford, Peter Hessler joined the Peace Corps and for 2 years taught English literature at Fuling Teachers College in Sichuan, China. His book, *River Town: Two Years on the Yangtze*, is a candid, compassionate, insightful picture of a part of contemporary China little known to Westerners.

Hessler traded the academic dictatorship of deconstructionists and multiculturalists for the major and minor tyrannies of the college's communist bureaucrats, going against their wishes to learn Chinese from private tutors. As Hessler gained fluency in Chinese, he began to speak and listen sympathetically to his students and the local people. He found they spoke more openly about sensitive subjects when speaking in Chinese than when speaking in English.

As a foreigner, Hessler confronted the strangeness of the Chinese to him, his own strangeness to the Chinese, and the rigor of the Chinese educational philosophy, an experience common to all who have studied Chinese in the Chinese world. Hessler's students were examples of the Chinese educational system. They were first-generation college students—the sons and daughters of peasants—who became schoolteachers after they returned to their villages.

For the students Fuling, small by Chinese standards, was cosmopolitan. The city soon underwent radical change. After existing on the river for more than 1,200 years, parts of the city were to be submerged by a lake created by Three Gorges Dam. The dam is an unseen presence in the book, and in dealing with it obliquely, Hessler shows us the way the Chinese people cope with the dictates of a far away, arbitrary government. The ways the people cope

are not new, but they were more frenetic in the years of Mao Tse-tung's mass campaigns and mass politics.

Hessler presents many pictures of provincial city life that engage readers' sympathetic attention as he narrates some of his students' and townspeople's lives. In fact, when leaving Fuling after his 2-year stay, Hessler wonders whether he will ever see the place again, and the reader is mildly shocked to realize that he is not just being sentimental.

Hessler has drawn a picture of a city and a society poised between stasis and change and has given readers insight into the ways Chinese society works outside large national and provincial centers. I recommend *River Town* for all who are interested in how the Chinese interact with foreigners on a day-to-day basis.

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**THE SLEDGE PATROL: A WWII Epic of Escape, Survival and Victory**, David Howarth, Lyons Press, NY, 2001, 233 pages, \$14.95.

*The Sledge Patrol* is a reprint of a 40-year-old book about a small skirmish on the periphery of World War II that helped decide the course of the war. When Germany occupied Denmark, Denmark's Greenland colony quietly seceded, and the colony's governor formed a militia. The militia, patrolling the coasts, prevented German landing parties from establishing military bases on Greenland. The lack of German forces on Greenland bases would have made little difference, except that Greenland offered an excellent position from which to invade Europe.

In Europe, weather moves from west to east, and in June 1944, Greenland weather stations predicted excellent weather conditions. German General Erwin Rommel's weatherman predicted continued storms in Normandy, so Rommel returned to Germany. U.S. General Dwight D.

Eisenhower's weatherman consulted Greenland's data, predicted good weather for the Normandy landing, and the invasion was on.

Author David Howarth writes eloquently, even lovingly, about Greenland's frozen terrain, despite the fact that the northern latitudes are so forbidding that all humans are de facto friends. Organizing the Greenland Home Guard from a handful of fiercely independent hunters, who were so few that Howarth describes each in detail, was not as difficult as the terrain. How the men overcame the challenges of patrolling in such a harsh environment provides lessons for soldiers who must conduct operations in severe climates.

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**ATLANTA WILL FALL: Sherman, Joe Johnston, and the Yankee Heavy Battalions**, Stephen Davis, SR Books, Wilmington, DE, 2001, 215 pages, \$55.00.

An Atlanta native and book review editor for *Blue & Gray* magazine, Stephen Davis has written an excellent short history of the decisive Georgia campaign of 1864. Davis covers a large amount of detail in his 214 pages. The result, however, is a readable, concise history of the campaign.

Davis does not let brevity keep him from controversy. He thoroughly reproaches Confederate General Joe Johnston for Johnson's seemingly endless retreating. Davis praises Union General William T. Sherman's actions. Davis also gives a sympathetic treatment of Johnston's successor, Confederate General John Bell Hood and the strategic dilemma he inherited on assuming command of the Army of Tennessee.

On assuming command, Hood was outnumbered three to two; Sherman's armies were within 8 miles of Atlanta and across the last natural obstacle before Atlanta, the Chattahoochee River. Despite these disadvantages, Hood held Atlanta for

6 weeks and did not give up the town without a fight. Davis states that when Hood took command, the fall of the city was inevitable. I believe Davis underestimated the vulnerability of Sherman's logistics. This vulnerability was not exploited, but it could have been.

The book's downside is its price. At \$55 for the hardback, the book seems expensive; the paperback, at \$17.95, is more reasonably priced. For a balanced treatment of an important and decisive campaign, *Atlanta Will Fall* is well worth reading.

LTC D. Jon White, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**SHERMAN: A Soldier's Life**, Lee Kennett, HarperCollins Publishers, NY, 2001, 426 pages, \$35.00.

For nearly a century and a half, General William Tecumseh Sherman has served as an enigmatic example of the cataclysmic nature of what the renowned Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz defined as absolute war. Infamously recognizable for the destructive quality of his Civil War campaigns, Sherman has long been regarded as both hero and villain, the difference dependent on one's location with respect to the Mason-Dixon line. Yet, while many have endeavored to capture the life and times of this controversial Union commander, none has brought to life the true essence of the man until now.

In *Sherman: A Soldier's Life*, award-winning military historian Lee Kennett crafts a uniquely accurate and vivid portrait of one of America's most notable and controversial military leaders. Exhaustively researched and chronicled, *Sherman* ventures beyond previous biographical efforts, focusing not just on the warrior and conqueror, but on Sherman's formative years before the Civil War as well as the eventful decades that followed our nation's darkest hour. *Sherman* is both fascinating and insightful; Kennett's prowess as a researcher and writer are evident throughout, resulting in a thoroughly enjoyable literary effort.

Of interest is Kennett's examination of Sherman's military and historical legacy; in death more so than in life, his campaigns fostered renewed interest and professional study. In the aftermath of World War I, Gen-

eral C.P. Summerall recognized the necessity of the destructive nature of Sherman's campaigns: "The most merciful way to conduct war was to bring it speedily to an end." In 1929, noted British historian B.H. Liddell-Hart published a biography on Sherman, crediting him as the first practitioner of the indirect approach—that most unanticipated and violent of methods that would one day serve as the hallmark of the Wehrmacht's remarkable sweep across western Europe. Kennett also notes that, as an integral participant in the first campaigns involving operational art, Sherman's own principles are now fundamental to the Army's warfighting doctrine, Field Manual 3-0, *Operations*.

Kennett, a professor emeritus of history at the University of Georgia, is the author of several acclaimed works of military history, including *GI: The American Soldier in World War II* (University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1977), *The First Air War: 1914-1918* (Free Press, NY, 1990), and *Marching through Georgia: The Story of Soldiers and Civilians During Sherman's Campaign* (HarperCollins, NY, 1995). In his latest literary endeavor, Kennett spent 5 years researching previously unexploited archival materials, ultimately producing what is undoubtedly the most enthralling and encompassing biography of Sherman to date.

Sherman once stated, "I must be judged as a soldier." If that is so, and we judge Kennett as a historical writer, then *Sherman* emerges as the definitive standard for the contemporary military biography.

A brilliantly composed literary effort, *Sherman* is a worthwhile addition to any library, particularly one devoted to the study of our Civil War.

MAJ Steven Leonard, USA,  
Fort Campbell, Kentucky

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**FIGHTING WITH THE SCREAMING EAGLES: With the 101st Airborne from Normandy to Bastogne**, Robert M. Bowen, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2001, 256 pages, \$29.95.

In 1943 Robert Bowen did what most patriotic Americans were doing—he enlisted in the Army to serve his country. Like many young men, he served faithfully until the war's end, wanting nothing more than to

return home alive. Bowen's war experiences changed him forever physically and psychologically, yet in a pattern commonly seen among veterans of that era, he quietly slipped back into the fabric of postwar America. In a nation full of veterans, all with personal, private war stories, Bowen did not feel his experiences were all that unique. Some might be compelled to agree with Bowen if they did not know he had served with the 101st Airborne Division in Normandy, in the Netherlands during Operation Market Garden, and in the defense of Bastogne. Fortunately, 50 years of reflection and a box full of saved wartime letters changed his opinion and now he tells his story.

In *Fighting with the Screaming Eagles*, Bowen tells the familiar story of the 101st Airborne Division in World War II from the less familiar perspective of glider components. Glider troops were an experimental wartime concept. Pilots endured incredible hazards in peacetime training and suffered tremendous casualties in combat employment. They fought stubbornly in the well-known battles of the 101st Airborne Division across Europe but were routinely overlooked in favor of their more glamorous brothers in the airborne regiments. Bowen dispels the unfair second-class stigma attached to glider troops and successfully tells their story.

Bowen also does several other things well in this work. His version of history uniquely captures the thoughts and emotions of a soldier from the 1940s; his narrative reads like a diary instead of a history. His accounts are largely drawn from his own wartime letters, dutifully saved by his wife. The letters, which provide first-hand accounts written within hours of each event, are a treasure of facts and emotions not subject to memories 50 years faded. They are, quite simply, a time capsule of the emotional culture of the period.

Bowen shares several perspectives about combat that are useful and purposeful to the student of warfare. He adroitly identifies that all combat is an individual experience. This is the reason why participants in the same battle, often only a few feet away from one another, recall the

same event differently. Also, Bowen points out that just being a survivor in war is an achievement. His amazing story, from historic pitched battles to prisoner-of-war experience, easily supports that testament.

I highly recommend Bowen's book for several reasons: it is good recreational reading for the historical student; it is a good historical reference of World War II glider troops; and it is an excellent resource for understanding the period experiences of the common infantry soldier.

**MAJ Ted J. Behncke, Sr., USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**WAR: Past, Present and Future,** Jeremy Black, St. Martin's Press, NY, 2001, 310 pages, \$35.00.

Jeremy Black is a professor of history at the University of Exeter in the United Kingdom. His research interests include early modern British and continental European history, with a focused interest in international relations, military history, the press, and historical atlases.

*War: Past, Present and Future* is a broad survey of war through history. Black relates war in its social and cultural context. The book recounts how the military evolved organizations that were influenced by society, national geography and climate, scientific research and technological development, national leaders, policies and strategy, and geo-political demands. Black addresses the topic with academic rigor and includes over 460 endnotes citing a vast array of sources. The book certainly is not soft reading. The reader must reflect and process the information, which makes the book both interesting and thought-provoking.

**Richard L. Milligan, Ph.D.,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**WAR AND REVOLUTION: The United States and Russia, 1914-1921,** Norman E. Saul, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2001, 456 pages, \$45.00.

Norman E. Saul's *War and Revolution* contains extensive, useful details on relations between the United States and Russia from 1914 to 1921, and it is definitely a book appropriate for specialists of this topic. The book's greatest strength is its ability to show the nongovernmental con-

nections between Russia and the United States, most of which attempted to bring about greater cooperation between the two countries.

Saul's book is more narrative than argument and contains little material that would interest soldiers and military historians. However, the book adds solid research to a field that has too often focused on official governmental actions.

**MAJ Curtis S. King, USA, Retired,  
Leavenworth, Kansas**

**GRANT'S LIEUTENANTS, Volume I: From Cairo to Vicksburg,** Steven E. Woodworth, ed., University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2001, 264 pages, \$29.95.

Inspired by Douglas Southall Freeman's classic *Lee's Lieutenants: A Study in Command: Gettysburg to Appomattox* (MacMillan Publishing Company, NY, 1986), editor Steven Woodworth examines several generals and two admirals who accompanied Union General Ulysses S. Grant during the first few years of the Civil War. Unlike *Lee's Lieutenants*, this work is neither a narrative of the war nor the product of a single author. Woodworth assembled several scholars who each examined one of Grant's subordinates and then analyzed their contributions to Grant and to the successful outcome of the war.

Critics might disagree over the editor's selections of Grant's subordinates. General William T. Sherman was an obvious choice. General James B. McPherson, one of Grant's most trusted subordinates, was another. To ensure consideration of the Navy's contributions to the victories in the Western theater demanded that Union Navy officers Andrew W. Foote and William D. Porter be included. Beyond those, however, the decision became more complex.

Few military historians recognize the name John McClernand, but Woodworth chose wisely to include this politician-turned-general who commanded a division under Grant at Henry, Donelson, and Shiloh, and a corps at Vicksburg.

Another unknown is Charles Smith, who had been commandant of cadets at West Point when Grant was a cadet. In an unusual twist he found himself as Grant's subordinate at Donelson.

W.H.L. Wallace had fought in the Mexican War, returned to civilian life, and then reentered the army in 1861. Wallace also served in Mexico, then practiced law, and finally rejoined the Army. Whether both Wallaces' contributions are so unique to warrant their inclusion is a valid question.

Peter Osterhaus, a general probably unknown to any except a close student of the Western campaign, is an interesting choice for consideration. He was born in Westphalia and immigrated to the United States during Germany's upheavals in 1848. He subsequently commanded a division under Grant.

Rarely is Grenville Dodge associated with Grant. He is included because of his critical efforts to provide Grant logistical support as well as for gathering intelligence.

William Rosecrans is another questionable lieutenant. He served under Grant from only July through October 1862. Rosecrans again became Grant's subordinate when Grant became general-in-chief.

Critics will disagree over the merits of Woodworth's selections for his book. There are several others who could merit inclusion. Andrew J. Smith and Eugene Carr, both of whom served as Grant's lieutenants, were the only commanders on continuous active duty from their West Point graduations until the Civil War. George W. Morgan commanded a division at Arkansas Post and resigned after a disagreement with Sherman. Although the introduction provides a brief explanation of why certain lieutenants were included, another paragraph to explain why others were not included would have been helpful.

Photographs would have been nice, but more frustrating is the lack of maps. Because many events overlap, a few maps should have been included to indicate the critical points mentioned. The reader is forced to refer to other sources to determine exactly where particular events occurred.

Book-length biographies have not been published for Charles F. Smith, James McPherson, or Peter Osterhaus; therefore, the chapters on these officers are of particular

interest to students of the Civil War. The individual authors keep their focus on the relationship between their subject and Grant's success as a general. Overall the book is well worth reading because of this narrow focus and because of the dynamics of command relationships, not only in the Civil War, but in all of America's wars.

**LTC Richard L. Kiper, USA, Retired,  
Ph.D., Leavenworth, Kansas**

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### **COMBINED ARMS WARFARE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY,**

Jonathan M. House, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2001, 372 pages, \$19.95.

Recent U.S. Command and General Staff College (CGSC) graduates and those who have followed the publishing efforts of the Combat Studies Institute (CSI) will be gratified to see the commercial publication of Jonathan M. House's *Combined Arms Warfare in the Twentieth Century*. Originally published as a research survey titled *Toward Combined Arms Warfare* (U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1984), House's survey has long been one of the most comprehensive overviews of the evolution of the modern tactical battlefield.

As a CGSC text, the survey has consistently been one of the most popular of CSI's publications. As a leader in the publication of scholarly military history, the University Press of Kansas has wisely chosen to make the book available to the public. The current edition is updated, expanded, and illustrated, yet it retains the original's lucid analysis and solid research.

**LTC Scott Stephenson, USA,  
Retired, Ph.D., Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**NIGHTMARE ON IWO,** Patrick F. Caruso, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2001, 164 pages, \$23.95.

The battle for Iwo Jima, which took place over 50 years ago, is still the battle that many believe defines today's Marine Corps. Iwo Jima is the only battle in Marine Corps history where U.S. casualties outnumbered the enemy's. There were no great or grand tactics. The fight was measured in feet and yards, with the en-

emy fighting from a maze of interconnecting tunnels from which he could see but not be seen.

K Company, 3d Battalion, 9th Marine Regiment, 3d Marine Division, landed with the third wave. Within one hour of their initial assault, a young 2d Lieutenant, formerly sixth on the company's chain of command, found himself thrust to the fore and required to take the responsibilities of company commander. When it was over, only 40 of the original 230 men in the company remained, 100 percent of the officers were killed or wounded, including the young lieutenant. Patrick Caruso, the author, is that Lieutenant.

Wounded on the 14th day of the battle, Caruso was evacuated to a hospital in Guam. There he realized that his mind wanted to forget what he had seen and experienced and that faces and names were becoming difficult to remember. Caruso desperately wanted to keep alive the names and actions of all those who participated, so he began writing his recollections on any paper he could find; hospital napkins, paper bags, hospital reports, or anything else on which he could write were fair game for his notes. After the war, his wife typed the notes and put them away.

In 1970, Caruso wrote an article for the *Associated Press* as a commemoration of the 25th anniversary of the battle of Iwo Jima. The response to his article was tremendous. He received so many letters and calls from the men who were there or from their families that he decided to write a book.

Caruso's story is not about tactics or military strategy; it is a story of ordinary men in extraordinary circumstances. Caruso tells what happened in a matter-of-fact style, as he saw it, as he experienced it, and as in-depth as he could. Of particular interest are the vignettes he adds throughout the book. Various chapters cover specific actions and the individuals who were key players. After Caruso tells the story in his words, he often adds the recollections of survivors who took part in the action. This literary device could be distracting, but here it works. The reader is introduced to these remarkable men in an individual, personal way.

If you are interested in tactics and strategy, this book is not for you; however, if you are interested in the thoughts and feelings of the men who fought in this incredibly costly battle, you will find *Nightmare on Iwo* fascinating and satisfying.

**LTC David G. Rathgeber, USMC,  
Retired, Fallbrook, California**

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**HEROES NEVER DIE: Warriors  
and Warfare in World War II,** Martin Blumenson, Cooper Square Press, NY, 2001, 641 pages, \$32.00.

*Heroes Never Die: Warriors and Warfare in World War II* is a collection of 50 essays that Martin Blumenson wrote during the last 40 years. His topics range from short biographical essays to battle descriptions to leadership discussions. The book is a well-written narrative, and all the essays are relatively short.

The essays are arranged chronologically by date of publication. The problem with this is that some have similar content. Two of them, "Patton's Last Fight" and "The Death of Patton," differ only in that one includes personal letters discussing Patton's deathbed struggle. For another example, this line appears in at least three essays: "I have it," said General George S. Patton, Jr., "but I'll be damned if I can define it." Arranging the essays by theme or eliminating some that are too similar might have served better.

The book's main contribution is a collection of stories written especially for Patton fans. Almost one-fifth of the essays deals with Patton directly; another four or five mention him in passing. It seems as though Blumenson is trying to impart to the reader something about the character of very senior commanders, because he puts emphasis on senior leaders' effect on battles.

As a collection of essays on various topics, the book serves well. However, a thematic organization rather than a chronological one would probably have worked better. The book does have value for the defense community but, mostly, as a collection of stories about the military past.

**CPL David J. Schepp, USA,  
Fort Benning, Georgia**

**FROM BATTLEFIELD TO BOARDROOM: Winning Management Strategies for Today's Global Business**, Dennis Laurie, Palgrave, NY, 2001, 263 pages, \$24.95.

In his book, *From Battlefield to Boardroom*, Dennis Laurie asserts that “[t]he strategies of war are also the strategies of business.” He proposes a formula to generate winning business strategies by using military strategic thinking. He then identifies 10 examples of military strategy translated into business strategy. Laurie’s target audience includes senior business executives in positions to affect strategy and all others who wish to attain such positions.

Laurie’s work is entertaining, well written, and highlights the critical importance of mission and strategy and its components. He differentiates between strategy and tactics and drives home the lesson that while tactics is important, it is not the key to success. Laurie also is careful to qualify his theory, correctly stating that strategy depends on the circumstance and that the correct strategy for one business might be exactly the wrong strategy for another. He identifies basic circumstances in which his highlighted strategies would work well.

Laurie’s examples support his theory. For example, in deciding to attack an enemy’s strength, he argues that a leader might consider the current situation, the enemy, and the future situation. For example, the current situation is untenable; the enemy is strong, but vulnerable; and the situation will only get worse with time. To illustrate his point, Laurie describes the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

According to Laurie, the Japanese could not continue in their current situation. National pride allowed nothing less than victory. They clearly understood the potential might of the United States, but from detailed reconnaissance, they also knew that the U.S. fleet was poorly secured and rested unsuspecting at anchor. Finally, the Japanese knew that the American president was working to gain public support for war and would, given time, turn U.S. industrial power into an unstoppable

juggernaut of war. Combining detailed intelligence with surprise, preparation, and leadership, Japan was able to achieve a complete victory at Pearl Harbor.

Laurie then repeats the process for the strategies of attacking weakness, internal change, concentrating forces, strategic alliances, patience, controlling choke points, relentless attack, containment, and combat readiness. His examples are effective, and his analysis is thorough.

Two areas of the book could have been improved. First, Laurie declares that the mission is “the starting point for any strategic plan.” His position is that all else follows from the mission. I believe that in the military or in the business world, ultimate purpose and leader vision are the genesis for mission and strategy, which are then nested within the vision to support the purpose. Second, Laurie addresses only tactics and strategy, ignoring the operational level. Thus, in his Pearl Harbor example, he blames Japan’s ultimate failure on a lack of back-up strategy. I believe, however, the attack was an operation and that Japan did not properly anticipate the consequences of its success on overarching strategy. As a result, the United States was unexpectedly galvanized for war.

Perhaps Laurie’s lack of military experience led to these oversights, which do not detract from his overall message. Targeted at executives and would-be executives, the book is worthwhile for any aspiring strategymaker. Its military audience is decisionmakers above brigade. Students at the U.S. Command and General Staff College are thus a perfect military audience.

**MAJ Todd Calderwood, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**THE 92ND INFANTRY DIVISION AND THE ITALIAN CAMPAIGN IN WORLD WAR II**, Daniel K. Gibran, McFarland & Co., Jefferson, NC, 2001, 198 pages, \$29.95.

When World War II began, the United States had not been engaged in war for over 75 years. However, the challenges African-American soldiers faced were just as glaring as they had been since the declaration

of the Emancipation Proclamation.

Racial segregation, poor pay, and inadequate living conditions were characteristic of the “colored” troops’ lifestyle during World War II. In *The 92nd Infantry Division and the Italian Campaign in World War II*, Tennessee State University Professor Daniel K. Gibran explores the role of an all-black unit as it fought in Europe.

Gibran examines the reasons behind the 92d Infantry Division’s poor performance on the battlefield—low morale because of racial segregation, limited facilities, and lack of trust in white leadership. His book tells the story of Major General Ned Almond, a white commander who was vilified as a racist and perceived as a poor military strategist by black soldiers. Other anecdotal stories include those of Vernon Baker and John Fox who emerged as leaders but endured a long struggle for recognition.

Gibran concludes the book by detailing his investigation of why no African-Americans received the Medal of Honor during World War II. Gibran’s book, which is well written and smartly compartmentalized, is at once a chronological history of an all-black unit in World War II struggling to gain the respect of the Nation and a tribute to every black soldier who has served the country since its inception.

**LTC Dominic J. Caraccilo, USA,  
Vincenza, Italy**

**DARK AND BLOODY GROUND: The Battle of Mansfield and the Forgotten Civil War in Louisiana**, Thomas Ayres, Taylor Trade Publishing, Dallas, TX, 2001, 273 pages, \$24.95.

Thomas Ayres, in his latest history, *Dark and Bloody Ground: The Battle of Mansfield and the Forgotten Civil War in Louisiana*, talks from a Southern perspective that is somewhat subjective, but highly readable. The hero of the story is Confederate General Richard Taylor, son of President Zachary Taylor.

One problem with Ayres’ book is his extensive use of subjective sources although he does rely heavily on Taylor’s memoirs. However, Taylor was prone to embellish

his tale. Also, Ayres' attention to detail is sometimes suspect. For example, he relates that the Confederates surrendered "Fort Donaldson" in Tennessee "on high ground overlooking the Cumberland River near it[s] junction with the Mississippi." The correct spelling is "Donelson," and the Cumberland River does not form a junction with the Mississippi River, but with the Ohio River. These small details are not important to Ayres' story, but it makes the reader wonder if Ayres got other details wrong. Finally, the book suffers from a lack of footnotes and good maps of the Louisiana theater. Overall, however, this book is entertaining and tells of a little-known theater of the American Civil War.

LTC D. Jon White, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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**THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE: The British Army in North America, 1775-1783**, John Fortescue, Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, PA, 2001, 263 pages, \$34.95.

*The War of Independence: The British Army in North America, 1775-1783*, by John Fortescue, is a substantial step toward understanding the Revolutionary War, and the work shows the strengths and weaknesses of all parties to the war. Congress and Parliament are the only elements cast in a uniformly negative light for showing a self-serving lack of support to their respective militaries. Of the relevant parties, only General George Washington's party receives uniformly favorable coverage.

Fortescue shows an astonishing command of 18th-century tactics and the battles of the Revolutionary War, major and minor. Of great value to the scholar and casual reader is Fortescue's analysis of why American Colonists won and why Great Britain lost. Great Britain was in a world war with colonies covering half the world and was at the same time enemy with half of Europe.

Patriot militias are credited with part of the Colonists' success. Militias could hold the Colonists' rear areas and control loyalists, and every time British patrols went inland for firewood or strategic advantage, the local people shot at them. Plagued by organized militias, guer-

rilla bands, and disgruntled individuals, the British could go anywhere, but hold nowhere.

Kevin L. Jamison, *Attorney at Law*,  
Gladstone, Missouri

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**MACARTHUR AND DEFEAT IN THE PHILIPPINES**, Richard Connaughton, The Overlook Press, Woodstock, NY, 2001, 394 pages, \$35.00.

More than a generation after he died, General Douglas MacArthur still generates interest and controversy. In *MacArthur and Defeat in the Philippines*, Richard Connaughton, a retired British officer who has written about the Battle of Manila and the Russo-Japanese War, concentrates on MacArthur's first Philippine campaign.

To place the campaign in context, Connaughton examines U.S. military policy in the Philippines through 1942, especially MacArthur's attempt to construct a Philippine army after 1935 and the subsequent failure of the Philippine army in battle. However, Connaughton does not understand the U.S. military planning process or provide enough of the 1941 political-diplomatic context to make MacArthur's statements and actions completely intelligible. MacArthur's idea of creating a citizen army had merit, but the Commonwealth government did not have the fiscal wherewithal or the political will to make it a reality. The U.S. military's long-term pessimism about the feasibility of defending the Philippines as well as MacArthur's tendency to make rash promises he could not fulfill complicated the situation.

Connaughton dissects MacArthur's character and examines how it affected his decisions when faced by military dilemmas; a lack of money and equipment; and general unpreparedness multiplied by the difficult Filipino geography. MacArthur's command received infusions of equipment and personnel despite President Franklin D. Roosevelt's Administration's desire to concentrate its military and diplomatic efforts in the Western Hemisphere and Europe. Connaughton, however, does not explain the situation Army planners faced in midsummer 1941 and the political reasons for reinforcing the Philippines.

Most of the relevant documents that dealt with MacArthur's failure to launch a counterstrike after receiving the news of Pearl Harbor and his culpability for the destruction of most of the Air Force on the ground are missing. Connaughton, left to sort out contradictory personal accounts, concludes that such documentation did not survive. Either they were destroyed in the defeat, or MacArthur's wartime headquarters had no interest in fixing responsibility for the fiasco.

Connaughton also criticizes MacArthur's overall handling of the campaign and finds MacArthur's self-delusion and persuasive "nonsense" to be dominant at that time. While ingenious, MacArthur's forward strategy was flawed because it did not reflect the military realities he faced. Instead, his strategy was dictated by local political realities, belief in the war-winning abilities of the heavy bomber, and a dismissal of Japanese military capabilities.

The communiqués MacArthur sent to Washington, D.C., reflected wishful thinking rather than the actual military situation subordinates reported to him. His romantic predilection to pose as a warrior-general resulted in a logistical nightmare that gave the invading Japanese an advantage they should not have had. If the Filipino-American Army had been led with greater imagination, flair, foresight, and planning, an entirely different set of possibilities might have arisen. The actions of the Philippine Scouts showed the potential of Filipino soldiers. It might be argued that a general who had greater talents and abilities as a troop trainer than those MacArthur possessed might have done a better job. But, MacArthur's genius lay in the fact that he had instinctively mastered the politics of war and the art of political spin better than any other military figure. Connaughton's judgment is harsh but just: he finds that MacArthur's moral courage did not match his unquestioned physical courage.

MacArthur relied on his loyal staff to filter ideas and create orders based on his vague notions. Throughout World War II and Korea, MacArthur had the benefit of

splendid field commanders who could plan and execute operations beyond the abilities of his personal staff.

Nevertheless, Connaughton concludes that MacArthur cannot be held entirely responsible for the Philippine debacle. The Philippines Islands were lost because of the Japanese pre-emptive strike at Pearl Harbor and their destruction of the Far Eastern Air Force. Ultimately, the United States did not have enough equipment and trained men to save the islands. I find this conclusion questionable because as the commander, MacArthur carried the ultimate responsibility for victory or defeat; his main task was to win the campaign, and he failed.

Despite his failings, MacArthur's rhetorical gifts, political prominence, and America's need for a hero combined to keep him in command throughout the Pacific War. I recommend this book as a case study in leadership and as a study of military realities versus political desires.

**Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D.,  
Huntsville, Alabama**

**CIVIL WAR: Acoustic Shadows,** Charles D. Ross, White Mane Books, Shippensburg, PA, 2001, 174 pages, \$24.95.

In *Civil War: Acoustic Shadows*, Charles D. Ross explains how the scientific occurrence called "acoustic shadow" affected the critical decisions of commanders during seven Civil War battles. Several Civil War reports mention acoustic shadow, which Mark Boatner, in *The Civil War Dictionary* (David McKay Company, Inc., New York, 1980), defines as "a phenomenon that results in sound being inaudible to persons a short distance from the source while the same sound may be heard over a hundred miles away. . . ." As Ross demonstrates through terrain and weather analysis and the use of official reports, such a phenomenon did occur several times during the Civil War.

In an era when battlefield telegraphy was impractical, sound was the primary means by which commanders grasped what was happening on the battlefield. Were that sound masked or absorbed by hills, vegeta-

tion, wind, or atmosphere, what an individual standing in a particular location hears could be severely affected. On the battlefield such effects could be disastrous.

While Ross presents a clear picture of the effects of acoustic shadow on the battles he analyzes, his explanation of why the phenomenon occurs is not as clear as he intends. His attempt to simplify the explanation of the complexity of sound is commendable, but his explanations of such principles as rarefaction (movement of molecules) and the effect of temperature on refraction remain rather difficult to follow.

Peripherally, Ross mentions that several commanders did not actively seek information when something appeared amiss nor did they alert their senior commanders when they engaged in battle. The reasons why they did not keep their superiors informed should have received more attention than Ross gives. Although Ross did not mean for *Acoustic Shadows* to be a detailed battle or leadership study, he should have taken to task commanders who, despite not hearing a battle, should have known one was taking place.

As Ross explains, acoustic shadow is caused by specific conditions. He could have aided the reader by explaining why, under similar conditions, the effect did not occur. For example, Chancellorsville was fought in May 1863. The battle of the Wilderness occurred in almost the exact location one year later. Why was there no acoustic shadow in the second battle?

Better maps would have helped readers understand how terrain could produce or affect acoustic shadow. Ross uses several maps from *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War*, edited by Robert Underwood Johnson and Clarence Clough Buel, (Harrisburg, PA: Archive Society, 1991) that, because of the extensive detail, make it difficult for the reader to follow along with the narrative.

Overall this is an interesting book. Acoustic shadow is known to Civil War historians and students of particular battles, but it has not been previously examined in its entirety. Certainly Ross has provided an ex-

cellent starting point for an understanding of this scientific phenomenon.

**LTC Richard L. Kiper, USA Retired,  
Ph.D., Leavenworth, Kansas**

**MAKING WAR, THINKING HISTORY: Munich, Vietnam and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo,** Jeffrey Record, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2002, 216 pages, \$28.95.

Every U.S. president who has agonized over the application of force when making the final decision to go to war relies on history, precedent, and personal experience to help him reach the ultimate decision to send U.S. Armed Forces into harm's way.

*Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo* by Jeffrey Record delves into the lives of seven U.S. presidents and their decisions to commit forces in Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and other 20th-century conflicts. Record, a professor of strategy and international security at the U.S. Air Force Air War College, Montgomery, Alabama, has been a staff adviser on national security affairs for two senators and served as a staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The 1938 Munich Agreement that sought to appease German Fuhrer Adolph Hitler has shaped the decision to go to war of every U.S. president from Harry S. Truman to William Clinton. Truman saw North Korean forces assaulting South Korea in 1950 as the first test of the United Nations (UN). Truman reasoned that if the United States did not respond to the North Korean invasion of South Korea, then the UN would dissolve.

Dwight D. Eisenhower saw similar threats in Indochina and believed that the Munich Agreement applied to the Soviets. Record argues that this belief blinded Eisenhower and kept him from seeing Vietnam for what it was—a colonial struggle. America, fearing the domino effect that communism posed to Asia, supported the 1954 Geneva Conference decision that led to the withdrawal of French forces from Indochina. Vietnam was divided into North Vietnam and South

Vietnam, and a reunification election was mandated to be held in one year. Subsequently, South Vietnam, with the support of its Western allies refused to hold elections, fearing that Ho Chi Minh would win.

Probably no U.S. president understood the lessons learned from trying to appease Hitler better than did John F. Kennedy. During Kennedy's administration the Department of Defense adopted the concept of "flexible response," the ability to deal with communist aggression at the nuclear, conventional, and insurgent levels. Vietnam offered the first opportunity to test this policy.

Ho Chi Minh was no Hitler. While Hitler had desired total dominion over Europe, Ho Chi Minh wanted to reunify Vietnam, which did not pose any shift in power between noncommunist Asian allies.

Record also touches on the presidential decisions of Richard M. Nixon, George H.W. Bush, and William Clinton, all of whom had to weigh the risks and advantages of ending or beginning wars. Record's is an excellent book for those interested in strategic-level military history and presidential decisionmaking.

**LCDR Youssef H. Aboul-Enein,**  
*USN, Gaithersburg, Maryland*

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**MILITARY JUSTICE IN AMERICA: The U. S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, 1775-1980,** Jonathan Lurie, University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, 2001, 400 pages, \$25.00.

How do we learn about the U.S. military justice system? A few learn about it when they face the dishonor of their trial by court-martial. And, some learn about it because they have the honor of sitting on a case as a court-martial member.

One of the best ways for historians, lawyers, military buffs, and military members to learn about military justice is by reading Jonathan Lurie's *Military Justice in America*, which takes an in-depth look at the history and development of the U.S. military justice system. While Lurie focuses on the Court of Appeals for the U.S. Armed Forces, he provides important background information about the court, the military justice system, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which recently celebrated its

50th anniversary. Lurie puts this anniversary in context. He shows the long, hard, political, and often personal battles that created the UCMJ and the court.

Lurie highlights key cases and events in U.S. military justice history, such as Andrew Jackson's New Orleans trial; the hanging of Secretary of the War John Canfield Spencer's son after a court-martial on the Navy brig *Somers*; and the military justice system during the Civil War. Lurie provides the most details when explaining the reform movements that occurred around World War I and after World War II. During World War II there were over 1,700,000 courts-martial. The vast number of cases and the subsequent vast number of prisoners prompted reforms in military justice that led to the UCMJ. This well-written book will appeal to any person interested in military justice or American history.

**Major Herman Reinhold, USAF,**  
*Yokota Air Base, Japan*

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**EISENHOWER AND CHURCHILL: The Partnership that Saved the World,** James C. Humes, Prima Publishers, Roseville, CA, 2001, 256 pages, \$24.95.

*Eisenhower and Churchill: The Partnership that Saved the World*, by James C. Humes, fails to show a partnership, and it fails to show how Dwight D. Eisenhower and Winston Churchill saved the world. The book is nothing more than a mediocre dual biography. Humes alternates from a chapter on Churchill to a chapter on Eisenhower, back to a chapter on Churchill, until the time in history when their paths finally crossed. After their historic 1941 meeting, their respective leadership responsibilities kept them from spending much time together. Once the war ended, they met only occasionally.

The book contains few chapters that deal with Churchill and Eisenhower together, so the book is not really about their partnership at all; it is two near-biographies stitched together by a marginally adequate attempt to show that the two men shared similar backgrounds and upbringings. But that does not work. Only by generalizing the commonalities to the point of meaning-

lessness can one successfully draw a parallel between being the son of a powerful, successful English politician and the son of a middle-class, mid-western American father. Equally shaky is Humes' attempt to equate Churchill's absent parents with Eisenhower's disciplinarian father.

There is a strong qualitative difference between Churchill's political success and subsequent collapse during World War I and Eisenhower's inability to obtain an overseas post. That both men attended military academies is meaningless, as is the coincidence that both had children who died the same year. Such links are weak, and it appears that Hume stresses such coincidences to prove a conclusion about his heroes despite the fact that hard evidence does not support his position. In these lives, there is as much difference as there is similarity.

Although the book's press release cites new research, the book lacks documentation. It has a three-page bibliography and cites a number of secondary sources, including only two oral history transcripts.

Overall the work disappoints; it uses forced connections to shore up its incomplete biographies. The title exaggerates; if the book is to justify its claim that Churchill and Eisenhower were the key players in winning the war, then it needs to show how they worked together to accomplish this feat.

**John H. Barnhill, Ph.D.,**  
*Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma*

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**AFTERNOON OF THE RISING SUN: The Battle of Leyte Gulf,** Kenneth I. Friedman, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 2001, 414 pages, \$29.95.

Finding a book about a single battle of World War II where the battle is not the one that "turned the tide" for the allies is difficult. In *Afternoon of the Rising Sun: The Battle of Leyte Gulf*, author Kenneth I. Friedman does not claim that the battle for Leyte Gulf was the battle that turned the tide. To him, the battle was the battle that crushed the power of the Japanese Fleet.

The battle of Leyte Gulf was, in truth, the final Japanese battle for the Philippines. General Douglas MacArthur was about to keep his

promise and return. The Japanese knew that if MacArthur was successful, he would be able to cut them off from the raw materials and supplies they desperately needed from Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.

The Japanese problem was exacerbated by a lack of ground and air forces to stop MacArthur. Japanese planners decided that their best hope was to attack the landing force with the still formidable Japanese combined fleet while MacArthur's force was most vulnerable. However, the Japanese knew this would not be easy since the landing force, headed by Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, included the U.S. 7th Fleet composed of over 700 ships. Also, Admiral William F. Halsey and the 3d Fleet, with more than 1,000 planes on aircraft carriers and 79 other ships, including 6 new Iowa-class battleships, deployed to help defend the 7th Fleet and the approaches to the Leyte Gulf. The only hope for the Japanese was to somehow lure the 3d Fleet away from the battle, destroy the 7th Fleet, and isolate any of the force that had made it to shore.

To do this, the Japanese sent a deception force, including all four of their remaining battleships, to entice Halsey away from the Philippines, a ruse they thought might succeed given Halsey's reputation for impulsiveness. Meanwhile, the balance of the Japanese combined fleet, including the super-battleships *Yamato* and *Musashi* were to sortie to the Leyte Gulf from a different direction and destroy the 7th Fleet and the landing force. The plan was bold, daring, and desperate, and it almost worked.

Halsey did indeed take the bait and left the approaches to Leyte Gulf undefended. Worse, he did so against his superior's direct orders although in his defense, the wording of his orders was sufficiently vague. Also, the lack of a unified command structure in the area did not help matters. For example, Kinkaid did not even know that the approaches were left open, and thus, he was completely caught by surprise. Kinkaid erroneously believed that before Halsey had left with his aircraft carriers, he had built a task force around the 3d Fleet battleships and left it

behind. Messages that needed to be delivered instantly took hours because of the requirement for them to go through two separate command structures before being delivered. Only the dedicated and decisive actions of Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague, the amazing heroism of his ship's crew and officers, and favorable weather prevented disaster for the United States.

The Japanese had major problems executing their plan. Japan's command structure was even more complex and less unified than the Allies' and all but eliminated coordination and timing of their complex plan. Japanese commanders' decisions were sometimes difficult to explain, unless one accepts the theory that from the beginning of planning, some commanders never believed in the potential for success.

The Battle of Leyte Gulf deserves careful study by military officers of all branches of service. The battle is a fascinating study of strategy, tactics, impact of commanders on battles, small-unit leadership, unity of command, and combined arms warfare. The battle was the last time that the U.S. Navy conducted classic naval maneuver crossing the T.

*Afternoon of the Rising Sun: The Battle of Leyte Gulf* presents a clear, well-researched, comprehensive look at the battle, its intricacies, and its importance. The book is fascinating and thoroughly enjoyable. Friedman's work deserves a time-honored place in every military student's library.

**LTC David G. Rathgeber, USMC,  
Retired, Fallbrook, California**

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**THRICE CAUGHT: An American Army POW's 900 Days Under Axis Guns**, Odell Myers, McFarland & Company, Jefferson, NC, 2002, 164 pages, \$29.95.

*Thrice Caught: An American Army POW'S 900 Days Under Axis Guns* is the interesting story of Army Air Force 2d Lieutenant Odell Myers, who was shot down on his fourth mission over Tunisia, captured by the Germans, and held in an Italian prisoner of war (POW) camp until Italy surrendered to the Allies. Myers was then transported to Germany, where he spent another 3

years. Along the way, he escaped twice, only to be recaptured and returned to captivity.

As interesting as the story is, this small paperback adds little to the body of World War II POW literature. One interesting bit of trivia is that one of Myers' fellow prisoners, David Westheimer, wrote *Von Ryan's Express* (Doubleday, New York, 1964) and based it on a fictional escape from the same camp.

**COL John Messer, USAR, Retired,  
Ludington, Michigan**

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**MOLTKE AND THE GERMAN WARS, 1864-1871**, Arden Bucholz, Palgrave Publishers, NY, 2001, 240 pages, \$21.95.

What do modern militaries owe to old Prussia? According to Arden Bucholz, quite a bit. However, the unhappy memories associated with two world wars have warped our view of 19th-century Prussia and its remarkable army. Our associations tend to make the Prussian army a mythological demon. Bucholz writes that only when one gets past 20th-century images of storm troopers, Nuremberg rallies, and *Stukas* can a modern reader fairly appreciate the Prussian army's pioneering development of modern concepts of war planning, staff organization, and operational command and control, not to mention its extraordinary battlefield performance.

Bucholz, a history professor at the State University of New York, Brockport, is well qualified to reframe our view of the Prussians. He has written extensively on German military history. To offer a fresh interpretation of the three Wars of German Unification, he layers his own research for *Moltke and the German Wars, 1864-1871*, on that of Gordon Craig, Michael Howard, and the eyewitness accounts of Theodor Fontane. Using concepts taken from 21st-century information and organization theory, Bucholz offers an original analysis to create a synthetic history that reemphasizes the debt that modern armies owe to the Prussians.

The connecting thread throughout *Moltke and the German Wars*, is the role of a most extraordinary man, Helmuth von Moltke, of whom

Bucholz writes, "He is one of the first of a new breed: the modern, self-made, technically educated, professional officer." More than anything else, Bucholz's book is a biography, but it is military biography superimposed on the history of a warfighting institution—the Prussian army—and on narrative accounts of Prussia's wars with Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), and France (1870-1871). And, it is as a biography that this book works best, as Bucholz convinces us that Von Moltke's role in creating modern military processes has been undervalued.

Brought up in an environment that immersed him in the world of ideas, Von Moltke entered a Prussian army that Gerhard von Scharnhorst and others had turned into a true learning organization. Von Moltke's broad education and indomitable self-discipline, coupled with the unique lessons he drew from serving with the Ottoman Turks, earned him the role of adviser to Prince Frederick Charles. The royal family recognized Von Moltke's talents, and after Prussia had botched the initial phases of the war with Denmark, Von Moltke's role as Chief of the General Staff was transformed from relative insignificance to battlefield command of the Prussian army. From this position, he led Prussia to victory after victory.

The key to these victories was the intellectual process that Von Moltke applied to the problem of preparing for war and his rigorous analysis of past failures while introducing the concepts of risk management to war planning. By emphasizing worst-case scenarios in developing his plans, he built a margin for error that grew steadily with every enemy mistake. Von Moltke's plans were tested by endless war games and staff exercises, and by the time a conflict began, he had already envisioned the general course of the upcoming operation. His mind and method enabled him to look far beyond the time horizon of his less adaptive opponents.

Overall, Bucholz' combination of military biography, organizational description, and battle narrative works well. His narrative is strongest when dealing with Von Moltke's

generalship and the Prussian system. He suggests no criticisms of Von Moltke's personality and generalship, yet he convinces the reader that this is no hagiography.

Unfortunately, Bucholz's editor did a poor job, especially in the campaign chapters. The chapter on the Danish War, for example, is barely readable, suffering from sentence fragments, uncertain pronoun references, and irrelevant trivia. Also disappointing is a scarcity of maps. The editing lapses are genuinely distressing because they detract from an otherwise superb book. Still, the book earns a hearty recommendation. One hopes that future editions will be revised to bring all chapters up to a uniform standard of excellence.

**LTC Scott Stephenson, USA, Retired,  
Ph.D., Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**FOUR YEARS WITH THE IRON BRIGADE: The Civil War Journal of William Ray**, Lance Herdegen and Sherry Murphy, eds., Da Capo Press, New York, 2002, 446 pages, \$27.50.

Much had been written about the Union Iron Brigade's exploits during the American Civil War. The Iron Brigade, which participated in nearly every major engagement in the East, endured incredible casualties. Only a few returned to their homes in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Indiana. Sergeant William Ray was one of that lucky few. *Four Years with the Iron Brigade: The Civil War Journal of William Ray* chronicles Ray's personal story. Editor Sherry Murphy, Ray's great-great granddaughter, and co-editor Lance Herdegen capture the essence of a common Civil War soldier's life—in thought and deed.

Ray joined the Seventh Wisconsin Volunteer Infantry in 1861 as a private and served with the unit until being mustered out in 1865 with the rank of sergeant. His account of his experiences as a common soldier are riveting, and they magnificently capture the monotony of endless drilling, guard duty, and camp chores that consumed most of his days. He also captures the terror of sudden, deadly combat. Ray received serious wounds at Gainesville, Gettysburg, and the Wilderness. His wounds

may have saved his life; he was hospitalized during the deadly engagements at Antietam and Second Bull Run.

The editors leave Ray's words as he wrote them; they bring to life the jargon, mannerisms, and linguistic habits of the time. Ray describes camp life, the toil of survival, the laziness of his tentmates, and guard duty in the rain. His accounts of casualty evacuation and medical treatment offer rare insight into the era's conditions.

*Four Years with the Iron Brigade* is a soldier's story, and at the same time, it is a priceless window into America's past. We are lucky that Ray recorded his story. We are even luckier that his words survived. His is a great book, and I recommend it for students and historians alike.

**MAJ Ted Behncke, Sr., USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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**STALIN AND THE SOVIET-FINNISH WAR, 1939-1940**, Alexander O. Chubaryan and Harold Shuklman, eds., Frank Cass, London. Distributed by ISBS, Portland OR, 2002, 301 pages, \$80.00.

Before the Germans invaded the Soviet Union in 1941, the Soviets fought a war with the Finns that lasted from the winter of 1939 to the spring of 1940. The war, called the Winter War by the Finns, was on the whole unsuccessful for the Soviets in relation to the aims they espoused before its outset. The Soviet's goal was the annexation of the majority of Finland, predicated on Stalin's belief in the need for a *cordon sanitaire*. At the conclusion of the war, however, only a section of the Karelian Isthmus had been successfully negotiated by treaty.

*Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, 1939-1940*, is a transcription of a series of after-action meetings held in Moscow in April 1940 and attended by most of the major commanders involved in the war. The book includes a short introduction to the Soviet-Finnish War, the after-action meeting transcriptions, a list of the participants with short biographies, and a few relevant maps. It illustrates how much a truly open forum can affect a country's military affairs. Despite the Soviet Union's reputation for oppression and repres-

sion, the meetings seemed to be remarkably open to the honest views of the participants.

With some understanding of the conflict, it is possible to extrapolate much from what various Soviet commanders learned from their mistakes, especially in the area of artillery. One of the book's high points is Stalin's closing remarks in which he describes some of the troubles he had as a political commissar during the civil war that occurred about 20 years earlier. It makes one wonder how much of the speech is true and how much is false, based on Stalin's tendency toward revisionism of his revolutionary biography.

Overall, the book is remarkably interesting to read. It is intriguing to read a book that just a little over 10 years ago would not have been available to readers in the West.

**SPC David J. Schepp, USA,**  
*Fort Benning, Georgia*

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**CLASH OF ARMS: How the Allies Won in Normandy,** Russell A. Hart, Lynne Rinner Publishers, Boulder, CO, 2001, 469 pages, \$79.95.

In *Clash of Arms: How the Allies Won in Normandy*, Russell A. Hart has captured, through intense research, the correlation between U.S., Canada, Great Britain, and German armies during World War II. He meticulously dissects each army into several categories of preparedness and execution, including an analysis of each army's World War I doctrine and how each failed to transition its doctrine to fit the conditions of World War II. Hart also discusses political trends and military institutional hierarchy and what effect these hierarchies had on each country.

Hart builds compelling arguments about each country's strengths and weaknesses during the interwar years. He is particularly harsh on Britain, stating how inflexible and unwilling it was to change its army's hierarchy, and he stresses that politics was the overriding factor that led to the neglect of Canadian forces. He praises the United States and Germany for their continued development during the interwar years. Finally, he tells how isolation and a lack of resources affected doctrinal thought and force development of the United States.

Hart uses the battle of Normandy as a testbed for determining if the armies were successful during the interwar years, adjusting his theory as he canvasses the experiences of each army as it entered the Normandy conflict. Of particular interest is his analyses of the general officers and how they adapted and evolved their approaches to warfare. Hart draws correlations between training and doctrinal development during the execution phase of the operations in Normandy, and lists pros and cons of how each army conducted itself.

Some of the lessons learned from each army were the same; however, tactics, techniques, and procedures varied drastically for each. One lesson that Hart stresses, both in the interwar period and during the war, was the ability of each army to gain intelligence. How each army developed its doctrinal approach and how it revised its approach during the war was of particular interest.

Hart suggests that it is critical for armies to have the capability to fight for information to maintain contact within their forces to develop tactical situations. All the armies learned hard lessons, and each developed its forces and doctrines to meet the varied challenges.

I recommend this book because of Hart's superb research and historical insight. The bibliography alone is a priceless wealth of information for anyone doing historical research.

**LTC Billy J. Hadfield, USA,**  
*Beavercreek, Ohio*

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**INDONESIA'S TRANSFORMATION AND THE STABILITY OF SOUTHEAST ASIA,** Angel M. Rabasa, Peter Chalk, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2001, 100 pages, \$15.00.

*Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia* is a report the RAND Corporation prepared for the U.S. Air Force to assess the rapid changes occurring in Indonesia and to recommend policies to the U.S. Government and the Air Force in response. The book is an excellent introduction to the complex situation that followed the end of the Suharto regime. Although its depth of coverage is rather limited by its length, it includes numerous

footnotes and an extensive bibliography, which covers five pages and includes numerous academic papers, periodical articles, and reports from international conferences. Sources come not only from the Western world but also from Indonesia itself. This breadth of coverage improves the quality of Angel Rabasa's and Peter Chalk's summary and provides a valuable source for anyone seeking to further investigate the subject.

The report begins with a succinct summary of the situation in Indonesia through 2001 and includes the growing pains of the post-Suharto political system; the conflict and United Nations intervention in East Timor; and the separatist pressures in several provinces. This summary also provides several recommendations that focus on improving the country's stability and regional influence and U.S. Air Force policies toward Indonesia. The summary concludes with a caveat recommending that the Air Force continue to prepare for the worst-case scenario of complete Indonesian collapse. The remainder of the report elaborates on the points that the initial summary contains.

The publication also includes chapters detailing Indonesia's regional significance; its recent and future challenges; and opportunities for U.S. influence. Each chapter effectively presents its subject matter and is well documented, allowing the report to serve as a useful introductory publication to the region and a guide to further research.

The only real criticism one might level against the report is its tone. In an attempt to achieve currency and relevance in 2001, Rabasa and Chalk chose to write in a journalistic style, which makes the piece read much like a long article in a current periodical. While this approach might have been effective in 2001, today it reads like old news. Despite this shortcoming, the authors effectively summarize a complex situation in a relatively short space. Therefore this report remains of value to the military professional as an introduction to the region and as a comprehensive bibliography.

**LCDR Kyle B. Beckman, USN,**  
*Fort Leavenworth, Kansas*

**HAPPINESS IS NOT MY COMPANION: The Life of General G.K. Warren.** David M. Jordan, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2001, 401 pages, \$35.00.

General Gouverneur K. Warren, a regimental, brigade, and corps commander as well as a chief engineer of the Army of the Potomac, is a tragic figure of the American Civil War. He is best remembered for two main incidents. In the first, on his own authority, he ordered Colonel Strong Vincent's brigade to an unoccupied Little Round Top just before Confederate Lieutenant General James Longstreet's attack on 2 July. In the second, he was relieved of command, 8 days before the end of the Civil War for his lack of promptness and diligence in the battle of Five Forks.

Warren's military career is a case study in the relationship between command responsibility and the authority to relieve subordinates. Warren was a democrat and a McClellan man and possessed some of that officer's undesirable penchant for ponderously slow movements. Warren also shared General George McClellan's abhorrence for attacking fixed fortifications. This is all the more unfortunate since Warren's rise to corps command coincided with the point in the war at which field fortifications became a *de rigueur* component of the war in the east. Warren's caution put him in an even less favorable light when General Ulysses S. Grant brought his aggressive style of fighting to the eastern theater in 1864.

Warren considered his proudest moments to be his refusal to follow orders to assault the Confederate field fortifications at Mine Run in 1863; his ambush of Confederate Lieutenant General A.P. Hill's corps at Bristoe Station; and his refusal to arrest the Mississippi State legislature for their crime of trying to meet during Reconstruction.

David M. Jordan's telling of Warren's story is smooth and passionate, sometimes too passionate, such as when he described Union Lieutenant General Philip Sheridan as having a "pitchfork and a forked tail." Residents of the Shenandoah Valley of Virginia in 1864 might have agreed with this assessment, but it is a little too passionate for a biography writ-

ten more than a century after the event.

Jordan does not mention any alternatives to the traditional story of Warren on Little Round Top. After the war, members of the Signal Corps said that they had difficulty convincing Warren that Confederate troops were about to assault Little Round Top, an action for which Warren has been given great credit.

Overall, this biography is thorough and informative. Jordan tells the story of a Union officer who did great work for the Union cause, and who was, perhaps unjustly relieved after his greatest triumph.

**LTC D. Jon White, USA,  
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

**FORT UNION AND THE UPPER MISSOURI FUR TRADE,** Barton H. Barbour, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 2001, 304 pages, \$34.95.

Barton H. Barbour creates a vibrant portrait of Fort Union, the earliest American trading post on the upper Missouri. The fort, which was active from 1829 to 1869, is now in western North Dakota. Barbour recounts the techniques that went into the fort's construction and the people it served. He describes the various demographic groups in the area: the Indians, the artists, the traders, the trappers, the clerks, and the soldiers. Barbour also outlines American Indian policies during the period leading to the plains Indians wars.

While called a fort, Fort Union only occasionally served soldiers; mostly it served private enterprise, and served it well. Despite small trading companies looking for short-term profits, the dominant company, the American Fur Company, had a vested interest in leaving the Indians to hunt as they pleased, and treating them fairly, finding them canny traders.

Barbour details the laws that Fort Union's residents lived by, those that attempted to govern the Indian trade, and those with which the residents chose to govern themselves. Despite being on the frontier, the fort was safer than many eastern cities. The balance of terror between the walking arsenals, who populated the fort, and the need for mutual cooperation worked against Hollywood frontier violence. Only twice in four decades were area residents "outlawed" by

the community in the Old English sense. This status was essentially an open contract on their lives, a contract satisfied by sending them out of the country. Rich historical detail makes this book a valuable asset for scholars of the frontier and of Indian history.

**Kevin L. Jamison, Attorney at Law,  
Gladstone, Missouri**

**CHINA SINCE TIANANMEN: The Politics of Transition,** Joseph Fewsmith, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001, 320 pages, \$26.95.

Joseph Fewsmith, a historian who began his scholarly career by investigating the attempts of Shanghai commercial and political elites to create a civil society between 1890 and 1930, eschews predicting apocalyptic change. Instead, he shows readers how social and economic changes since 1989 have affected political and intellectual scenes. Because of his broad knowledge of Chinese history, Fewsmith is not stampeded to radical conclusions. This book is a continuation of his investigation of the socio-political relationships among China's elites since the 1890s.

*China Since Tiananmen: The Politics of Transition* is organized in three parts: the unsuccessful post-1989 attack on Deng Xiaoping's reform program; the simultaneous changing definition of reform and rebirth of popular nationalism; and the interactions of elite power struggles with popular nationalism. Fewsmith concludes with an assessment of China's changing relationship with the world.

Fewsmith feels that the key to understanding the shape of contemporary Chinese politics and society lies in the contemporary intellectual critique of the enlightenment tradition, the foundation of liberal intellectual thought since the May Fourth Movement of 1919. He uses this appraisal to explain the rise of popular and elite nationalism as well as Chinese neoconservatism since 1989. He also examines elite politics and the ways factional alliances have changed in this same period to show how Chinese political conduct has changed. When both of these analytic streams join, the reader gets a coherent assessment of the socio-

political forces that drive contemporary Chinese politics.

Fewsmith's analysis shows that those who expected rapid economic and political reform in the 1980s and 1990s were bound to be disappointed, just like those who expected rapid political change in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident were disappointed. He explains that the reasons for these disappointments lie in the nature of Chinese politics, with its deep-rooted tradition of factional elite competition and strife, a divided intellectual community, and volatile popular sentiments. Using a variety of Chinese language materials, Fewsmith shows how Jiang Zemin's government is under siege by social forces it cannot control, like the accelerating erosion of Chinese Communist values and ideals as well as the rise of popular nationalism.

Fewsmith also lays bare the intellectual debates that have moved beyond the academy, partially marginalizing intellectuals. As Chinese society is liberalized by market reform and freed from the constraints that the communists placed on it, a new debate about fundamentals is taking place that goes far beyond the debate started by May Fourth Movement intellectuals. Questions being raised include, "Must all societies follow the liberal-capitalist model to democracy and liberal economics?" And, "Are there values beyond moneymaking worth preserving, or should everything be evaluated on a profit and loss basis?" Although others have previously posed these questions, they are now being discussed with new urgency. The questioning goes beyond traditional Chinese or Marxist analytic categories and is informed by the Western currents of postmodernism, neo-authoritarianism, nationalism, and liberalism.

By focusing on these questions, Fewsmith takes us inside the debates between policy-oriented intellectuals and the maneuvering of the top leadership. He cautions us to remember that social liberalization is not being replicated in the political culture.

Fewsmith shows that while the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square were more outward-looking than those in power, the exact opposite is true today; the government is more

outward-looking than are its critics. He goes to the root of contemporary Chinese politics to give the reader a coherent, credible narrative of fundamental political conflict. I recommend the book to all those with a professional interest in China and for those who want to understand the depths of its contemporary political struggle.

**Lewis Bernstein, Ph.D.,  
Huntsville, Alabama**

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**KILLING PABLO: The Hunt for the World's Greatest Outlaw.** Mark Bowden, Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 2001, 400 pages, \$25.00.

At the twilight of the Reagan-Bush era, Pablo Escobar reigned at the pinnacle of the illegal drug trade. Wealthy beyond avarice and arguably the most powerful criminal on the face of the earth, Escobar was ruthless. Unmitigated violence characterized his ascension from petty thief to billionaire drug lord. Violence is at the nexus of this tale of the rise and fall of an unremarkably common man. A violence that he exploited, manipulated, and effectively sculpted into a sadistic art form.

In 1887, Lord Acton wrote, "Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely." Ironically, the brutal violence that catapulted Escobar into power became a drug unto itself, and his cavalier abuse of that savagery ultimately decayed the roots of his power. Escobar's demise began in 1989 with the assassination of Luiz Galan, a popular Colombian politician and leading presidential candidate. Galan's murder was followed three months later by the bombing of a plane and the deaths of 110 people, including two Americans. At that point, Bowden asserts, Escobar stopped being just "a thorn in the side" of the United States to becoming "Public Enemy Number One."

On 22 July 1992, Escobar escaped from his luxurious mountaintop prison, from where he had maintained the drug trade that continued to ship over 70 tons of cocaine to the United States each month. As Colombian forces surrounded and prepared to move the drug lord to a prison more befitting his stature as a violent criminal, Escobar slipped away into the night, evading an entire brigade of Colombian infantry. In true tech-

nothriller fashion, Bowden vividly describes the evolving situation in exciting and excruciating detail. From the moment the United States directed its vast resources toward capturing "Don Pablo," Pablo's life was forever changed.

Drawing on his experience as a reporter for the *Philadelphia Enquirer*, Bowden uses personal interviews, eyewitness accounts, and a criminologist's eye for detail to construct the story behind the rise and fall of the world's most powerful criminal. Bowden tells two parallel tales: one, a story of the human dimension, is an account of Escobar and the culture that fostered his ascension to power and the excruciating toll the manhunt exacted on his pursuers; the other is a gripping tale that literally propels the reader into the action.

*Killing Pablo* is a unique, superbly written account of Escobar's story. Exhaustively researched and presented with an inspiring tenacity, the book takes the reader into a darkness that few of us can imagine. And, as if an apocalyptic battle between the forces of good and evil were not enough, Bowden leaves us on a precipice as the story draws to a close.

Many readers will appreciate Bowden's uncommonly stark portrayal of a Colombian society and culture that was ideal for the harsh education and development of a criminal mind such as Escobar's. Others, however, will not be able to ignore the relevance of this story to current counterterrorism operations.

Escobar carelessly, and without regard to the inherent consequences, wielded violence and cocaine as tools of his trade. Ultimately, he awoke the "sleeping giant" (the United States) and introduced a new terror into his own life—a terror that offered relentless pursuit from which there was no escape. In his final months of life, Escobar learned to fear the violence that characterized his existence.

The operation that eventually brought the Colombian drug lord to his death was lengthy, deliberate, and somewhat anticlimactic. Some would say that a violent end is the only justice men such as Escobar can expect or rightfully

deserve. As readers of *Killing Pablo* will certainly appreciate, efforts in the war against terrorism parallels the war on drugs. *Killing Pablo* is well worth reading.

**MAJ Steven Leonard, USA,  
Fort Campbell, Kentucky**

**TERRORISM: Informing the Public.** Nancy Ethiel, ed., McCormick Tribune Foundation, Chicago, IL, 2002, 196 pages, free.

*Terrorism: Informing the Public*, an addition to the Cantigny Conference Series, is an academic work that turned into surprisingly well-presented, informative reading for those who delve into the shifting sands of media-governmental relationships.

The book's appearance is timely, arriving during early 2003 at a time when the *New York Times* reported that the fear epidemic in the United States was spreading much faster than the severe acute respiratory

syndrome (SARS) epidemic. In the same issue of the *Times*, Frank Rich speculated that if cable television taught us anything during the Iraq war, it is this: battalions of anchors and high-tech correspondents can cover a conflict 24/7 and still tell us less about what is really going on than could any 27 pre-digital reporters who accompanied the U.S. troops in Normandy on D-Day.

For those who want quick-fix answers, not much of a consensus emerges from *Terrorism: Informing the Public*. The government functionaries at the conference (and it is an impressive list) continue to assert that the media overdramatizes everything, while the media representatives' (an equally impressive list) knee-jerk retort that "no comment" answers given during the heat of a terrorist strike will bring out instant analyses by outside experts just as

the Iraq war brought out a brigade of "rent-a-generals" and "rent-a-colonels."

On the other hand, in between these polar stances, this thin book, available free, inaugurates a necessary dialogue and makes some important points. "When there is no real news," asks the editor, "why can't the interim period be used by both the press and the government to educate rather than speculate?" And, "Why can't special media training be started in which both sides participate as equals (a model that would seem to combine a warfighter exercise with the pre-Iraq 'media basic training')?" One of the most inviting sections of this conference report is a role-playing scenario that illustrates how complex it is to manage and report on a bioterrorism incident.

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