

Leaders for America's Army

The Active Army, U.S. Army Reserve, and the U.S. Army National Guard share a high level of military competence. These remarkable levels of citizen-soldier competence, created by training to common task, condition, and standard, have never before occurred in U.S. military history. Author Frederic J. Brown argues that this competence mandates a searching review of leader development policies and practices.

Leader development is arguably the most important single program of any army.

GROUND COMBAT, the most complex of military endeavors, is characterized by infinitely variable terrain, human interactions under great stress, and complex missions. Ground combat often combines military, political, economic, social, and religious elements, always in an uncertain environment. The quality of America's Army's leaders, from corporal to general, determines the outcome of ground combat. As combat evolves to incorporate highly variable land, sea, and air power mosaics, combined increasingly with special operations, leaders must assume even more dominant roles.¹

Genuinely new leadership requirements have arisen since the events of 11 September 2001. President George W. Bush put the mark on the wall: "All nations that decide for aggression and terror will pay a price. We will not leave the safety of America and the peace of the planet at the mercy of a few mad terrorists and tyrants. We will lift this dark threat from

our country and from the world."² National Security Strategy now identifies preemption, recovery of failed states, and Homeland Security as major military missions. Each new mission, alone and in combination, places new joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) responsibilities squarely on the plates of Army leaders at every grade. Leaders must discharge their responsibilities in support of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and within the United States in support of the Department of Homeland Security and of the commander of the U.S. Northern Command.

The emerging requirements that the Nation is placing on leaders of all grades are formidable. Leaders must have the ability to understand, then achieve, harmony among the imperatives of doctrine, training, leader, organization, materiel, soldier (DTLOMS). Company commanders must be able to see and act in combat across the battlefield operating systems (BOS) from the perspective of the battalion or perhaps even the brigade commander; squad leaders must understand their first sergeants' cross-BOS perspectives.³ Increasingly, the charac-

ter of operations requires that—and more. Recent events have required the Armed Forces to transition rapidly from combat in preemption to stability and support operations (SASO) in failed states or to emergency relief to civilian authority in Homeland Security. These missions add to an already broad spectrum of commitment.

Understanding the skillful application of land-power imperatives across BOS is necessary but increasingly insufficient. A leader must also understand the mosaic of land, sea, air, and Special Forces at current and higher echelons. Combinations of land, sea, air, and Special Forces are available to leaders operating together in variable modular organizations composed to dominate immediate combat requirements. This just-in-time leader team building includes profound new leader development challenges.

Clearly demands on leaders are changing. The excellent work that training and leader development panels conducted in the past several years has aged. The Army needs to open a dialogue regarding current and emerging wellsprings of leader requirements and their likely effect on how America's Army develops its leaders.⁴

Discussion Points

Topics that Army leaders should discuss include the following:

- All soldiers corporal and above are leaders. They should be as diverse as is the U.S. citizenry and be prepared to lead others under stress whatever their other service competencies might be. As the Army accesses national samples of youth, it will find that it will change to meet the new generation's expectations, which in turn will bring about a cultural change in the Army. Despite this, as the nature of likely commitment broadens and traditional Army warrior values come under stress, the Army might require an increased "soldierization" of youth during their initial entry training.

- Digitization of the battlefield vastly increases information flow vertically (by function) and horizontally (by echelon). Leaders do not act alone. They perform routinely as members of larger teams. Preparing leader-teams is as important as preparing individual leaders.⁵

- America's Army is uniformly competent. Across selected functions and echelons, at least at the battalion echelon, the Active Army, the Army National Guard (ARNG), and the Army Reserve (USAR) share competence. These remarkable levels of citizen-soldier competence, created by training to common task, condition, and standard, have

never before occurred in U.S. military history. This competence, combined with high personnel tempo across both Active and Reserve Components since the end of the Cold War, mandates a searching review of leader development policies and practices.

- The Army should phase in changes to the unit personnel sustainment system from individual replacement to unit replacement where feasible. Unit

As soldier-leaders participate more frequently in complex interagency and multinational operations, they must possess firm grounding in the basic values of service. Strong shared values, comradeship, and doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures will be central to successful small-unit actions.

manning is not new. Special Forces and other high-priority units such as the 82d Airborne and the border cavalry regiments during the Cold War had repetitive assignment policies. Officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) came to know each other well from previous assignments and became highly cohesive units despite individual replacement policies. Nevertheless, implementing a hybrid unit replacement system will influence leader preparation.

- The Army is experiencing accelerated migration of leader tasks from higher to lower echelon leaders. Cascading excellence requires greater leader competence at much lower leader echelons than previously needed.⁶

- The Army must retain the requirements for leader competence despite the blurring of traditional concepts of service. A career pattern in which leaders may migrate from Active Army, to Reserve Component (RC), to contract civilian, to retiree appears increasingly likely. Traditional leader development prepares leaders for vertical advancement and anticipated advancement to positions of higher responsibility. Preparation should encompass horizontal task competency that cuts across traditional domains of service.

- As America's Army extends itself across the spectrum of operations, higher percentages of available forces will be committed. Some relief might come from contracting out jobs. Doing so would free scarce combat-ready soldiers to serve in combat. However, there will be an increased reliance on conscription when multiplying requirements and casualties empty the trained manpower reservoir.

Each of these wellsprings of leader development presages change to current leader development

policies and programs. When these are combined, a model significantly different from current models emerges. As Lieutenant General John Riggs said when speaking about the Objective Force, "The Objective Force is composed of *modular, scalable,*

Why train RC leaders in combat or materiel-development processes when the Active Army routinely provides Title 10 support? The ARNG now has important competing requirements to support Homeland Security. Many ARNG peacetime support tasks are state-unique and, thus, not learned in the Active Army's institutional training system. Time is spent learning, "just like" active leaders learn.

flexible organizations for prompt and sustained land operations."⁷ This Objective Force would be composed of highly competent leaders from every source of competence, from active, reserve, or retired military, or civilians. They would come together "just in time" to become high-performing teams to lead modular, scalar (graduated or stepped) units, which might themselves morph from Army to joint to combined to interagency. This situation is not much of a change for traditional rifle companies, tank companies, or artillery batteries, which are the enduring foundation of victory in close combat. But for all others, significant change in leader preparation and expectations of performance seems imminent.

Leaders All

Riggs also said, "In a transformed Army culture, every soldier is trained and equipped to be a decisionmaker."⁸ The Army approaches that level of preparation today. The NCO Education System (NCOES) addresses leader responsibilities in the primary NCO course for corporals. The course is essential for providing young soldiers with the skills, knowledge, and attributes (SKAs) necessary to step out from among their peers to assume leadership responsibilities. Senior NCOS, who have themselves been prepared to regard the development of subordinate leaders as one of their most important responsibilities, support young soldiers at every step of their training.

Ideally, new corporals will be able to attend a combat training center (CTC), where they will receive the world's finest experiential leader preparation. A CTC presents intense job-related challenges, with role-model NCOs (as observer/controllers)

mentoring, coaching, and training the young leader's actions. This will, in turn, prepare NCOs to become better mentors. The combination of competent, confident, motivated young soldiers who want to lead plus training received at NCOES plus CTC learning produces superb young leaders in combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) skills.


But there is more, which comes with an unintended but welcome benefit. The after action review (AAR) process at the CTC exposes soldiers to the same experiential learning opportunities provided to squad leaders, platoon sergeants, platoon leaders, and often, the fire support team, medic, and logistics operator. Frequently, the company commander and first sergeant will comment on why what occurred when. All participate in multiechelon AARs. Young leaders, attentive because of personal commitment to the mission, learn the tasks of "higher" like a sponge. In fact, they are encouraged to comment specifically on the performance of their seniors, peers, and subordinates. Doing so provides a profound learning and teaching experience. If they are to perform SASO missions, as in the Balkans, young leaders will supplement CTC learning by becoming leaders, practically influencing events at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels in a world of CNN and, now, embedded reporters. This is extremely effective leader preparation, which literally trains one or more echelons up.

Through a combination of programs, the Army has a leader train-up capability unequaled in modern times. By the time corporals have served 5 to 10 years, with multiple learning experiences throughout the world, they will be absolutely superb, not only in competence but also in the ability to mentor subordinates and to influence others.

These programs apply to the Reserve Component as much as to the Active Component (AC). Young leaders with several years of growth under their belts will soon approach competency levels formerly associated with Special Forces at comparable grades. Leader proficiency itself has become a fine example of cascading excellence.

Young leaders are strategic assets, particularly when their competence and confidence are applied in interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational operations. As evidenced in the Balkans and in Iraq in preemptive combat operations, young leaders' SKAs are of dominant importance in rebuilding failed states.

Leader task proficiency does not appear to be a problem. I am less certain about ensuring sufficient



Officers of the 14th Armored Cavalry Regiment trade jokes with Army Secretary Robert Froehlke at Grafenwoehr, Germany, October 1971.

US Army

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soldierization, the inculcation of warrior values on U.S. soldiers. As soldier-leaders participate more frequently in complex interagency and multinational operations, they must possess firm grounding in the basic values of service. Strong shared values, comradeship, and doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (DTTP) will be central to successful small-unit actions.

Genuine inculcation of values will take time. During the past decade, leader training in basic combat training has been preserved; however, future leader development might require a significant increase (a doubling?) of the current time allotted for basic combat training.

Leader Teams

Digitization has created an explosion of the quantity and quality of information on the battlefield. One major effect of digitization has been to fuse leaders at all grades with their commanders, their subordinates, and their peers. No one wants to fight alone. Teams thrive everywhere, communicating continuously in person or by various electronic means.

The squad or the fighting vehicle crew is a vital team. Teammates do not want to let their buddies down as they accomplish their missions. Every tank leader has a wingman, just as does a fighter pilot. The company commander is a member of a team composed of the battalion commander (up) and subordinate platoon leaders (down). The company commander is also a member of the team of all other company commanders in the battalion, cross-talking during the fight. So each company commander is a member of several teams simultaneously—vertically and horizontally. Likewise, the battalion operations officer is a member of a team of staff officers supporting the chain of command, and he is a member of a vertical team consisting of the operations officers at brigade and at division, all of whom must be prepared.

Teams create a whole that is much greater than the sum of its parts. There can be no reduction of the individual authority and responsibility of the commander at any echelon, but teammates can provide solid counsel, shared intelligence, and information. If senior; that is, in the chain-of-command team, the

senior team member provides mission and intent and advice and counsel while leaving as much initiative as possible to subordinates, just as subordinates are expected to provide the same to their subordinate leaders. If the members are on a horizontal staff or

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crew team, they are expected to support each other, which will benefit both teams.

Teams must be re-formed, nurtured, and reinforced when losses occur. To be high-performing, all teams, vertical or horizontal, must practice teamwork, team decisionmaking, and team leadership. The last consists of shared vision, trust, competence, and confidence.⁹ As the literature of team building grows, for both military and business applications, other requirements are advocated. Still, solid research and development (R&D) is yet to be done, particularly for hierarchical organizations performing under great stress. Clearly, preparing high-performing leader-teams is an increasingly important requirement.

The leader-preparation challenge is magnified when teams become unstable because of leader losses in combat or if task organizations change frequently. Emerging doctrine envisions frequent reconfiguration of modular units. The vision for the Objective Force is clear: "Teams form, change, relocate, expand, and disperse without effect to battle command."¹⁰

Recomposing leader-teams should be simple and routine, but each reconfiguration brings new leader combinations that must gel into highly proficient teams. When leaders from other services, agencies, or nations (each developed as a leader in another culture) are added, leader-team preparation becomes a complex challenge, which each chain of command must address.

Total Force Competency

Current levels of competency of AC and RC forces are remarkable and increasingly comparable. This has existed for several years in CS and CSS

units as all soldiers train to common task, condition, and standard and as RC units are activated more frequently for longer periods. Parity now approaches for combat units, particularly those in SASO missions. ARNG units understand the dynamics of political, economic, and social power because they live this in their daily lives. Repetitive call-ups have developed them into fully competent citizen-soldiers, at least to field-grade officers and NCOs.

The Army can develop and sustain sufficient military competence to make RC leaders interchangeable with AC leaders. This can occur at least through field officer grades and, probably, could include general officer or Senior Executive Service personnel. This would be especially applicable where the spectrum of service might be more political than military, such as supporting the local governor or subordinate mayor in Homeland Security or supporting SASO where the armed threat is low.¹¹

But, which areas should be included in shared competence and why? The opportunity cost (time) for preparation and the subsequent active service for citizen soldiers is high. Time requirements to gain proficiency in Title 10 tasks in institutional learning can be significant.¹² Why train RC leaders in combat or materiel-development processes when the Active Army routinely provides Title 10 support? The ARNG now has important competing requirements to support Homeland Security. Many ARNG peacetime support tasks are state-unique and, thus, not learned in the Active Army's institutional training system. Time is spent learning, "just like" active leaders learn.

The issue is the opportunity costs of developing leader competence for the Reserve Component. Time is limited, yet it is the most valuable resource in all units, particularly in the reserves.¹³ There is nothing that cannot be done well if preparation time is directed at one area of AC readiness, such as administration, leader classes, or unit training. Citizen-soldiers aspire to being "just like" their counterparts in the Active Army. "Just like" is a comforting goal that conceals the tough issues surrounding the allocation of focus and the time it takes to develop competence comparable with the Active Army. The ARNG and USAR have proven this can be done, which is a notable achievement that proves that the theories of Army futurist Emory Upton are no longer relevant.¹⁴

But what, in general, does unit retention and readiness cost? The Nation wants the Army to be an army of highly competent, genuine citizen-soldiers. During the Cold War, "just like" produced compe-

tent warfighting reserve-force leaders. How now should the Army direct this clear, time-costly, total force leader competence? Each component faces hard questions.


The ARNG. How much unit-leader preparation time should be directed at Homeland Security? How much focus on unit warfighting, SASO, or support to the State should be directed at homeland defense?

The USAR. How much focus should be directed toward traditional units to fill out a typical corps in contrast to developing high-tech leaders, teams, and units that can serve as the organizational nucleus for detachments or units created from the national talent pool as the need arises? In many land-power competency domains, the USAR provides national expertise.¹⁵ Is it appropriate to expand the USAR as a talent pool of defense expertise?

Being “just like” all-purpose, active units can become a cop-out for making the hard decisions about what expertise should lie with America’s citizen-soldiers. National leaders must really think through the manifest strengths of citizen-soldier leaders and how to magnify those strengths through leader preparation focused to address post-Cold War, post-9/11 challenges.

Hybrid Replacement System

The Army’s individual personnel-replacement policies have been controversial for decades. Individual replacement interrupts the development of unit cohesion. Presumably, unit replacement will improve stability and, therefore, facilitate the development of high-performing units. Major efforts are underway to introduce unit replacement where feasible. However, much individual replacement is mandated because recruiting inducements are individually tailored or because of difficulties in sustaining unit rotations in certain specialized units. Obviously, some hybrid system involving individual and unit replacement will evolve. This is an emotional issue, which is somewhat ironic given that Army requirements and capabilities are changing dramatically even as arguments flow.



Soldiers of the 1-77 Armor “Steel Tigers” discuss ongoing operations with Task Force Falcon commander, BG Douglas Lute, at the battalion TOC, June 2002.

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Little evidence exists that units cannot be filled, trained, and made into cohesive leader-teams before they deploy. In fact, this occurred prior to deployments to the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Mission rehearsal exercises (MREs) became a staple of unit team building. Where units deploy within hours, a combination of repetitive leader assignments, overfill, and intensive continuous training provides stability.

Rapid team building through experiential learning has advanced greatly during the past decade. Such intensified team building has become the staple of successful units preparing for CTC rotations and is, in fact, taught as part of the overarching CTC experience. This team building experience is doubly useful because units learn how to handle the personnel instability of combat.

However unit leaders might have been trained and prepared during peacetime, JIIM requirements apply once the unit deploys. Increasingly, new joint,

Pilots conduct an AAR following an exercise near Modrica, Bosnia, December 1999.



MREs are increasingly necessary, not just for Army units, but also for joint, combined, interagency, and intergovernmental teams. Solid, practical means exist to increase unit cohesion before combat, no matter what the personnel-replacement system might be. A clear requirement exists for shared experiential learning across various JIIM cultures that focus on critical leader positions—corporal and above—whether using individual, unit, or hybrid replacement systems.

interagency, and intergovernmental partners appear at the battalion level and above, so intensive leader-team building remains necessary whether unit personnel have been replaced as individuals or as units. MREs are increasingly necessary, not just for Army units, but also for joint, combined, interagency, and intergovernmental teams. Solid, practical means exist to increase unit cohesion before combat, no matter what the personnel-replacement system might be. A clear requirement exists for shared experiential learning across various JIIM cultures that focus on critical leader positions—corporal and above—whether using individual, unit, or hybrid replacement systems.

As America's Army advocates modular, scalar units composed in flexible task organizations designed to fight at the tactical level, unit replacement might well not be desirable.¹⁶ Some issues still need

to be addressed, such as—

□ Determining how to handle the various leader-team building problems when “Leader’s All-,” JIIM-, and “just-in-time”-composed units fight. Perhaps it is appropriate to distinguish between combat arms platoons and below, which should be unit-replaced, while company and above and staffs are filled with individual replacements.

□ Determining how long a just-in-time unit, filled with specific competencies, needs to train together to become a high-performing leader-team.

□ Determining if the same cohesion-building programs are appropriate for all platoons, given routine personnel instability because of casualties, which is why the NCO content is so high in combat arms units.

Clearly, cohesion within fighting units is important, but cohesion can be achieved with intensive experiential learning. Attracting and retaining the best of America is more important; so more individual replacements might be necessary to provide the opportunities that quality youth seek. Shared values, intensive bonding experiences, and

DTTPs, reinforced by emerging communities of practice, might compensate where cohesion through unit replacement is not practical.¹⁷ Shared vision, DTTPs, and the lore of the arm or service seem likely to permit rapid cohesion-building once the team for combat is formed. Combined with pragmatic hybrid replacement policies, this might be the best answer at this stage in Transformation.

Downward Migration of Leader Tasks

In 1993, I became concerned that traditional blue-collar (NCO)/white-collar (officer) distinctions were disappearing and that the Army had not thought through the implications. At the time, I described a new way to approach the traditional blue/white-collar model: “The old blue-collar/white-collar distinction seems dated. I believe that this traditional dis-

inction is inadequate today, post-AirLand Battle, [so] it is more useful to think in terms of iron-, blue-, white-, and gold-collar personnel requirements. Iron-collar requirements are robotic, computer driven. Blue-collar now includes disciplined execution of assigned individual and collective tasks by blue- and iron-collar [personnel]. White-collar refers to leading in the accomplishment of single BOS missions (maneuver, fire support, air defense, or combat service support). Gold-collar refers to the ability to integrate iron, blue, white, and other gold successfully, in a rapidly changing situation, under stress. More precisely, it is the ability to conceptualize and successfully execute the focusing of multiple BOS functions in time and space to achieve the intent of the higher chain of command."¹⁸

I went on to say, "Gold collar could be the capability to accomplish innovative tasks that achieve tenfold to hundredfold increases in capability. They include the imaginative identification of new solutions, exploiting existing capabilities as they have not been combined before, or conceptualizing and actualizing, by computer, new ways to fight."¹⁹

In my analogy, sergeants and below are blue-collar, senior NCOs are white-collar, and most officers, particularly major and above, are gold-collar. I believe that the blue-white-gold distinction among tasks performed is valid. However, white-collar has moved from sergeant to corporal in terms of who should be prepared as leaders. In sum, all leaders, both officers and NCOs, are white-collar or gold-collar. These designations have important implications in terms of requirements for continuous learning and in the need to reconfirm the most basic warrior relationships of trust and confidence between officers and NCOs.

The pace of developing each aspect of DTLOMS mandates that, whether white- or gold-collar, all leaders should receive continuous learning. The Tactical Internet and, in time, Land Warrior, will provide each leader and leader-team with the capability to employ support across JIIM. Each platoon leader or fire support chief will be able to bring precision strategic support to tactical operations should events require. Delta operatives were able to do this in Afghanistan and more recently in Iraq, where this remarkably flexible, very hard power was available to Army and Marine small-unit leaders, Special Forces, or the CIA.²⁰ Current leaders' extraordinary competence provides tangible soft power. Young leaders "sold" Partnership for Peace (PfP) to Eastern Europe and elsewhere. The sheer competence and confidence of similar white- and gold-collar leaders

in combat in Operation Iraqi Freedom co-opted the world media embedded in units in Iraq.

This is power down to young leaders in a most profound sense. To be sustained, in fact increased, as envisaged in current doctrine, the Army must expand leader-learning opportunities to keep current in

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what exists and to employ what is coming. New learning opportunities should include Army Knowledge OnLine or the Warrior Knowledge Network. The remarkable experiences from Iraq should be shared across the Army through communities of practice.²¹ With such substantial task migration to younger leaders, the Army should rethink leader preparation, which should be continuous, as is characteristic of great learning and teaching organizations.²²

Some might see gold- and white-collar delineation as changing traditional relationships between officers and NCOs.²³ That should not be the case. In fact, vital traditional relationships must be reinforced. The basic relationship is expressed in the young officer shouting "follow me" to subordinates while leading by personal example. The sergeant trains soldiers to fight while the officer plans and leads the fight. Neither NCOs nor officers can accomplish their missions without each other, at least not in America's Army.

Former Sergeant Major of the Army Bill Gates expressed this central relationship between officer and NCO exceedingly well. He said, "We trust and respect the young soldier, the young private. The officers trust and respect the noncommissioned officers. And the noncommissioned officers trust and respect the commissioned officers. And it takes that entire team in order for the Army to work. And it works better than any other Army in the world. And it's very difficult to explain that relationship. [T]he introduction to a group about one or the other will go something like this. I know when I introduced my

company commander, I would always introduce him as this is my company commander. *My* company commander. And when you say that, that carries a tremendous message. This is *my* commanding general or this is *my* chief of staff of the Army. So that carries a powerful message. [Y]ou ask the lieutenant, you know, whose soldiers are these? These are

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my soldiers. This is *my* Army and that’s what soldiers say. This is *my* Army, not the Army. It is *my* Army, it is *my* unit. It is *my* lieutenant, *my* sergeant, *my* sergeant major. So people inspire to progress through the ranks of the noncommissioned officer corps because they can see how the NCO corps fits into the overall scheme of the Army” [SIC].²⁴ This vital relationship must be maintained, in fact, enhanced as downward leader-task migration continues.

Continuum of Service

The Objective Force 2015 concept paper, which proposes striking change to existing personnel-accession policies and programs, advocates establishing a continuum of service “from new recruit, to AC, to RC, to retiree or contractor. This allows trained, experienced soldiers and leaders to continuously serve. In effect a soldier is able to move from AC to RC status and back throughout his career.”²⁵

Application is best explained by a Department of the Army G1 advocate of continuum of service: “The only way to get an [AC lieutenant colonel (LTC)] today is to grow a 2d lieutenant, which takes about 16 years. Add the retirement package, and you’re looking at a big investment in time and money, and a pretty static, linear process. In order to rapidly increase or decrease a unit, we need the ability to bring skilled soldiers in and out of active duty. Before a buildup, we’d search the database of properly acculturated people (AC and RC) looking for the needed skills and grades. Skills could be acquired via military or civilian schools. Grade would be acquired much as it is now. But instead of growing an

LTC, we could take one off the shelf. During a drawdown after the mission, some members would move back to RC status, seamlessly. All members called up to AC status would retain any benefits earned during their AC stint. That is the continuum of service concept: Moving seamlessly in and out of Active Duty over a lifetime of service.”²⁶

Continuum of service is more than an abstract concept. The Department of Defense is preparing enabling legislation to be submitted to Congress.²⁷ The devil might be in the details, as concept becomes practice in a strongly competence-based Army, and as Congress seems certain to add changes. Nevertheless, there are challenging leader issues that will likely require research, including the following broad issues in lateral movement of personnel of all grades:

- Establishing, then maintaining, individual task proficiency to perform tasks to standard. Required task proficiency grows vertically appropriate to position and translates horizontally; that is, tasks for leaders as individuals and as members of teams. How proficient must individuals be prior to activation (grouped or distributed)? How much on reentry? Is preparation the responsibility of the unit, or the institution, or the individual? What military SKAs are equivalent to civilian SKAs and, thus, pose no problems to competency? What are appropriate ground rules to determine the lateral grade equivalence to be permitted when there has not been recent service?

- Assimilating, then demonstrating, practical understanding of Army values/culture appropriate to the position to be occupied. Do individuals retain Army values once trained in them? If initial entry training (IET) was received in another military service, does that suffice? What if there was no prior IET? What if the individual has never served? Is web-based training on Army values suitable?

- Determining, then using, incentives to retain desired personnel.

Establishing a continuum of service is long overdue in an Army that clearly requires the best in leaders regardless of the source. If highly competent warriors want to serve, they should. The implications of these important new policies, which permit the personnel system to seek, then access, the finest leader talent available in the United States, will be equivalent in cultural impact to the movement to an all-volunteer Army. The all-volunteer Army brought quality leaders from the bottom up, grown over time. Continuum of service will bring quality leaders laterally, from whatever source, practically immediately.

Pennsylvania Guardsmen attempt to pull a soldier from behind a defensive line during nonlethal weapons training in Bosnia, September 2002.



US Army

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Conscription Hedge

Various hedges have failed. The United States is facing serious military manpower shortages; therefore, the Nation must reinstate total mobilization and conscription.²⁸ A drafted Army must return, but doing so has immediate policy implications for the Army. For example, there would be a much higher percentage of Category (CAT) IIIB and IV soldiers. There would be a transition to a mobilization production base, which would likely compete for CAT I to IIIA soldiers—the strength of the current volunteer force. There would also be an activation of a mobilization-training base.

Most of the leaders for the expanding Army would be those present at the start of any hostilities. Hopefully, premobilization leader preparation policies will have prepared leaders to occupy posi-

tions several echelons higher than they currently hold. These officer and NCOs could provide battle-casualty replacements and leaders for immediate expansion units. The Officer Candidate School and NCOES would train new leaders from available draftees. NCOES' rigorous, competency-based standards could be maintained, although that seems doubtful if the mental category quality of the draftees declines. Experiential training practices should continue and likely be expanded.

A major leader source would be composed of retired and contract personnel who have participated in past continuum of service programs. They could support sustainment of the training base when experienced leaders become replacements.

Thanks to improved learning capabilities (training and education), grouped and distributed, rigorous

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training-requirements descriptions by task, condition, and standard and flexible leader accession and preparation precedents, leader preparation should be adequate in a drafted Army.

A New Model

Operation Iraqi Freedom demonstrated startling increases in the capabilities of Army units to fight fully integrated with JIIM formations. The Army has created new organizations to address new problems, such as introducing biological and chemical detection units. Such units comprise "an unusual group pulled together for the current campaign [composed of] members of all branches of the U.S. Armed Forces, as well as the British military and a host of civilian U.S. agencies."²⁹ This is startling, but not surprising. They are the most recent evolutions in spi-

ral development across each element of DTLOMS.

Combat in Panama, Kuwait, and Iraq were performance checks, as were PfP, the Balkans, 9/11, Afghanistan, and again in Iraq. Doctrinal visions have become reality with the concerted support of executive and legislative leadership. Most heartening has been the accelerating progress in the vital area of leader competence. Adaptive, self-aware leaders thrive. Continuum of service should spread this competence and confidence across a much broader leader pool. Precise expertise will be enabled through lateral entry. Leaders' individual and team competence seems certain to accelerate "cascading excellence" across a spectrum of conflict that has been broadly redefined since 9/11. Special Forces' individual and team competence is spreading across a much broader Army.

The next steps will provide supporting DTLOMS, particularly leaders and leader-teams accustomed to be grouped, just in time, to become high-performing teams to lead modular, scalar units, which might themselves morph from Army to joint to interagency to combined, to dominate execution of new missions, much as those created to detect biological and chemical weapons in Iraq. That is the future, today.

Other than more prepared leaders per small unit, not much will have changed for traditional rifle companies, tank companies, or artillery batteries, which are the enduring foundation of excellence in close combat. For all else, significant changes in leader performance and preparation seem imminent. **MR**

NOTES

1. The term "mosaic," as used by the U.S. Central Command and the media, describes varying highly adaptable patterns of operations conducted during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
2. President George W. Bush, in an address given at West Point, New York, 1 June 2002.
3. LTG Frederic J. Brown, "Imperatives for Tomorrow," *Military Review* (September-October 2002): 87-88.
4. For a definition of "America's Army," see GEN Gordon R. Sullivan and LTG Frederic J. Brown, "America's Army," *Military Review* (March-April 2002): 3-8.
5. For a general discussion of "teaming," see Brown, "Imperatives for Tomorrow," 84.
6. Brown, "Transformation Under Attack," *Military Review* (May-June 2002): 12.
7. LTG John Riggs, "The Objective Force in 2015," concept paper, final draft, 8 December 2002, i, on-line at Army Knowledge OnLine, accessed 9 December 2002. See also on-line at <www.objectiveforce.army.mil>.
8. *Ibid.*, 8.
9. For a more complete discussion of high-performance team requirements, see Brown, "Preparation of Leaders," Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), D2382 (January 2000), and "Vertical Command Teams," IDA, D2728 (June 2002).
10. Riggs, 13.
11. U.S. Army National Guard divisions were highly successful, total-force, AC/RC composite organizations that served in Bosnia.
12. For more information about Title 10, see U.S. Code, Title 10, *Armed Forces*, on-line at <www.4law.cornell.edu/uscode/10/>, accessed 22 May 2003.
13. Brown, "Imperatives for Tomorrow," 89.
14. MG (Brevet) Emory Upton, the preeminent Army futurist of the 1870s and 1880s, was a strong, controversial advocate of relying only on national defense policies and the regular Army.
15. As the commander of the Fourth Army, I was surprised to discover that I was in command of USAR units that were indisputably world class. One unit was a technical intelligence unit that was, in fact, on the leading edge of the R&D side of one of the ma-

16. Also known as ad hoc, hybrid, or just-in-time units. See Brown, *Army in Transition II: Landpower in the Information Age* (McLean, VA: Brassey's, 1993), 20-34, 113, 167.
17. See Brown, "Three Revolutions: From Training to Learning/Teaching and Team Building," scheduled for publication in July-August 2003 *Military Review*, which discusses the potential of Communities of Practice.
18. Brown, *Army in Transition II*, 110.
19. *Ibid.*, 111.
20. For an excellent discussion of hard and soft power, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *The Paradox of American Power* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 4-12.
21. See Brown, "Three Revolutions."
22. See Noel M. Tichy, *The Cycle of Leadership* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002), 2-19, for a theoretical discussion of a learning and teaching organization using Special Forces as "best practice" for business.
23. Although I do not discuss warrant officers here, by and large, they are considered to be gold-collar.
24. SMA Bill Gates, "All We Could Be," Interview, AUSA video, 11 November 1996.
25. Riggs, 7.
26. LTC David Doane, Army G1, to Dr. Kathleen Quinkert, Army Research Institute, E-mail message dated 20 March 2003, subject: DCSPER/M&RA Meeting, accessed 24 March 2003.
27. Vince Crawley, "Career Rule Reshuffle? DOD looks to simplify active, reserve requirements," *Army Times*, 14 April 2003, 30.
28. See "Quality over Quantity and Hedges," *Military Review* (July-August 2002): 68, for a more extended discussion of the effect of DTLOMS.
29. Mary Beth Sheridan, "For Unusual Task Force, an Unprecedented Mission," *Washington Post*, 12 March 2003, A10.

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